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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation studies semiparametric methods and their applications to 
economics and marketing problems. We propose a game theoretic model to analyze 
interactions among individuals in a social network with hierarchy. We find significant 
asymmetric peer effects among individuals in social networks. High status individuals 
deliver stronger peer effects on low status individuals than vice versa. Additionally, we 
investigate semiparametric panel data truncated regression models with fixed effects. We 
show the identification of our model with primitive assumption, establish the 
consistency and asymptotic normality of our proposed sieve estimator. We conclude that 
we can achieve √n -convergent rate for parametric parameters. Besides theoretical 
semiparametric methods, we study the dynamic effectiveness of marketing mix variables 
and the competition among the pioneer and early followers in pharmaceutical industry. 
With two pharmaceutical categories data, we find dynamic effectiveness of advertising 
and detailing inputs. Pioneer firms and follower firms have different effectiveness of 
advertising and detailing inputs in different stages. Our out-of-sample analyses show that 
when the data is rich, the semiparametric model outperforms the parametric model while 
it is better to deploy parametric model when the sample size is small. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, we study semiparametric methods and their empirical 
applications. The theoretical semiparametric methods range from discrete game model 
with sociological content of hierarchy and status; and panel data truncated model with 
fixed effects. Empirical applications include peer effects in college attendance decision 
among high school students with Add Health dataset; and dynamic effectiveness analysis 
of advertising and detailing in pharmaceutical industry. The theoretical studies enrich the 
literature in terms of combination of game model, econometrics and sociology and 
extend traditional parametric panel data truncated model with fixed effects to allow for 
flexible nonparametric components. Empirical study in college attendance provides 
policy implication that government can target on high status student to increase college 
enrollment rate. Empirical study in oligopolistic competition points out that the 
effectiveness of advertising and detailing are different for pioneer and follower firms and 
therefore the managerial implications from this study are different for pioneer and 
followers firms in different stages of competition. 
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CHAPTER II 
IDENTIFICATION OF HIERARCHY EFFECTS IN SOCIAL INTERACTIONS, 
WITH HAIQING XU 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Network models in the recent literature using game theoretic frameworks have been 
much successful to understand social interactions that are traditionally discussed in 
sociology. A leading example is the network formation, e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky 
(1996); Bala and Goyal (2000) for the theory side and Christakis et al. (2010); Sheng 
(2012); Mele (2011); Badev (2013) through the structural and empirical ways. Another 
example considers the network interactions, e.g., Jackson and Yariv (2007) and Galeotti 
et al. (2010) for theoretic analysis and Brock and Durlauf (2001); Xu (2011); Kline 
(2012) from econometric methodological perspective. The empirical applications range 
over the peer effects in education (e.g. Sacerdote, 2001; Angrist and Lang, 2004; Calvó-
Armengol et al., 2009), labor economics (e.g. Duflo and Saez, 2003), health issue (e.g. 
Trogdon et al., 2008; Carrell et al., 2011), juvenile behavior (e.g. Powell et al., 2005; 
Bayer et al., 2009; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012) and technological progress of a country 
(e.g. Fogli and Veldkamp, 2013) to name only a few. 
In this paper, we focus on the hierarchy effects in a social network. In sociology, 
hierarchy is a system in which people are divided into different levels of social status. In 
a social network, interactions between a pair of individuals are quite sensitive to their 
relative social status. Ball et al. (2001) use experiment approach and find that that higher 
status individuals in general are more influential and obtain more surplus than the same 
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individuals but with lower status. Bault et al. (2008) use experiment approach to study 
how Social Ranking Affects Choice Behavior. Ballester et al. (2006) establish a 
Bonacich (centrality)-Nash (equilibrium) linkage by looking at the role of key players in 
the social network and Becker et al. (2005) study the role of social status played in their 
resource allocation problem and the inequality. Another line of research, e.g. Robson 
(1992); Akerlof (1997); Luttmer (2005); Ray and Robson (2012) focus on how the 
relative social status directly affect the utilities of agents. For more details on the 
hierarchy and status, we refer to Wasserman and Faust (1994); Podolny (2005); Sauder, 
Lynn and Podolny (2012), etc.  
Our paper contributes to the empirical social interaction literature that emphasizes 
the role of network in explaining direct and indirect peer effects and the strength of the 
indirect effects (Xu, 2011; Blume et al., 2013). First, we develop a game model of 
incomplete information to capture the interactions among individuals with different 
social status in the network. The utility function of each individual depends not only on 
own choice but also her friends’ choices. The strength of such interactions relies on the 
social status of her friends as well as her own status. For example, the behavior of an 
individual with a low social status could be influenced by a high status friend, but the 
effect would be much smaller if this friend also comes from the low social status group. 
For policy purposes, it is our interest to define and quantify the hierarchy effects, which 
is clearly different from the peer effects. In our framework, both effects can be identified 
and distinguished from each other. Our model is related to Xu (2011), which investigates 
only peer effects.  
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A key advantage of our game theoretic approach is to deal with the simultaneity of 
interactions in social interactions by following the standard Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 
(BNE) solution concept. The simultaneity issue has long been central to sociology and 
economics (see e.g. Manski, 1993, the “reflection problem”). Ignoring such an issue 
would cause endogeneity in empirical analysis. In equilibrium, strategic effects are 
pervasive in a social network: an individual’s behavior is affected by her friends, her 
friends’ choices are further affected by friends of friends, etc. Along the network, one 
individual affects the others directly or indirectly. Such simultaneity is well captured by 
the BNE solution concept. Similar as the work by Brock and Durlauf (2001); Durlauf 
and Ioannides (2010); Blume et al. (2011) and Xu (2011), we employ a static discrete 
game of incomplete information.  
Second, we establish the identification and estimation of the proposed game model. 
Under primitive conditions, we provide semiparametric identification of the structural 
game model. In particular, we require the number of friends to be bounded above and the 
interaction strength to be reasonably small. The former is needed for the reason that the 
data actually come from the equilibrium of one single large game, instead of repetitions 
of the same game. A similar restriction is implicitly embedded in time series where the 
data are from a single time path. The latter condition is analogous to the unit root 
restriction in time series for the dependent data analysis. This condition is imposed for 
two reasons. First, it ensures that the equilibrium is unique. Under a similar condition, 
Brock and Durlauf (2001) also obtain the uniqueness of equilibrium in their setting. In 
empirical analysis, an obvious obstacle from multiple equilibria is the incompleteness of 
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the econometric model (see Tamer, 2003). The second reason is more essential: the 
small interaction strength implies the network stability condition (see e.g. Jackson and 
Wolinsky, 1996; Xu, 2011), which limits the dependence of choices across individuals in 
the network.  
For estimation, we propose a nested pseudo likelihood estimation (NPLE) method 
for our large game with social interactions. In a seminal paper by Aguirregabiria and 
Mira (2007), they propose NPLE for solving the computational difficulty in dynamic 
games. In particular, this approach does not require solving the fixed point introduced by 
the definition of the equilibrium. It is a natural extension of their approach to our large 
game: similarly to dynamic games, it is costly to compute the equilibrium in a large 
network game using a fixed point algorithm. This is because the space that the fixed 
point lives in has a high dimension, which equals to the number of individuals in the 
social network. The advantage of this algorithm is that we do not actually compute any 
equilibrium of the game, but adopt an iterative estimation procedure that converges. 
Note that our NPLE is related to the MLE type estimator suggested by Xu (2011), but 
the difference is essential.  
Specifically, the proposed NPL method starts with an arbitrary guess of the choice 
probabilities, e.g. the predicted choice probabilities from a regular Logit estimation that 
takes no strategic effects into account. Then we conduct another Logit estimation by 
using the given choice probabilities as the equilibrium choice probabilities. After that, 
we obtain an update of the predicted choice probabilities from the estimates. So on and 
so forth, our iterative algorithm for NPLE consists of a sequence of Logit estimations 
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until the estimates converge and for each iteration, we update the equilibrium choice 
probabilities. In a large social network game, the NPLE is quite attractive to practitioners 
due to its simplicity for implementation. Under further regularity conditions, we 
establish the consistency and asymptotic normality for our NPL estimator.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an introduction of the 
social network model and the concepts of status and hierarchy. Section 3 characterizes 
the BNE and establishes its uniqueness. Section 4 provides nonparametric identification 
of our model. Section 5 introduces two estimation methods, Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation and Nested Pseudo Likelihood Estimation, and establishes their consistencies 
and asymptotic normality. Three Monte Carlo experiments are executed in Section 6. An 
empirical study of college attendance is conduct in section 7. All proofs are given in the 
appendix. 
 
Figure 1 Social Network and Social Status 
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2.2. SOCIAL NETWORK MODEL 
We consider a static discrete game of incomplete information in a large social 
network. There are n individuals, indexed by 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ≡ {1,⋯ ,𝑛}, exogenously located in 
the network and each individual 𝑖 is socially connected to a group of friends: 𝑖 names a 
set of individuals as her friends, denoted as 𝐹𝑖 ⊆ 𝐼/{𝑖}. Let ℓ𝑖𝑗 = 1 if 𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝑖 and ℓ𝑖𝑗 = 0 
otherwise. Therefore 𝐹𝑖 = {𝑗 ≠ 𝑖: ℓ𝑖𝑗 = 1} . Note that the friendships need not be 
symmetric, i.e. ℓ𝑖𝑗 ≠ ℓ𝑗𝑖 is allowed. An example of social network is shown in Figure 1. 
Each individual 𝑖 simultaneously makes a binary choice 𝑌𝑖 ∈ {0,1}. In our empirical 
study in section 7, we consider college attendance decisions of high school students. In 
particular, we take 𝑌𝑖 = 1 as the choice of enrolling for undergraduate education and 
𝑌𝑖 = 0 for not entering colleges. The utility function of individual 𝑖 choosing 𝑌𝑖 = 1 is 
given as follows: 
𝑈𝑖1 = 𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + �𝛼�𝑌𝑗 , 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗�
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
+ 𝜖𝑖                                                                                        (1) 
The first component is the mean utility that is determined by each individual’s 
demographic characteristics 𝑋𝑖 ∈ ℝ
𝑑 . The second term characterizes peer effects from 
the choices of individual 𝑖′𝑠 friends. Last, there is an unobserved utility shock 𝜖𝑖. When 
individual 𝑖 chooses 𝑌𝑖 = 0, the utility is set to be zero, i.e. 𝑈𝑖0 = 0, which is a standard 
payoff normalization in binary response models. 
In equation (1), 𝑆𝑖 is the social status of individual 𝑖, which is the main objective of 
our interest. The social status is related to the respect one has in the eyes of others, 
Magee and Galinsky (2008). In our setting, the social status is determined by the number 
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of friend nominations received from others. To illustrate, consider the social network 
established by Twitter, we can take 𝑆𝑖  as the number of followers. For notational 
simplicity, we take 𝑆𝑖 as a binary variable in our empirical analysis. Specifically, 𝑆𝑖 = 𝐻 
if individual 𝑖 is with a “high” social status and 𝑆𝑖 = 𝐿 if she is with a “low” social status. 
The high or low social status is determined by the number of nominations from other 
individuals in the network and captures the centrality of individuals in the network. The 
functions 𝛼 and 𝛽 are structural parameters of interest, which are nonparametric. Not 
using parametric assumptions on the utility function is practically cumbersome, but 
ensures that the identification of our model comes from the essential model restrictions, 
instead of from a particular selection of the parametric function form. In our empirical 
study, however, we assume 𝛽(⋅) is a linear index which can be estimated at the √𝑛 rate. 
It is worth pointing out that the network structure is assumed to be exogenously given in 
our model and we consider static game. The evolution of network formation is an 
interesting and deep subject in the literature, see, e.g., Christakis et al. (2010); Mele 
(2011); Sheng (2012); Kline (2012) and Badev (2013), however, which is not the focus 
of this paper. 
2.2.1. Status and Hierarchy Effects 
A crucial concept in our analysis is the social status, which mainly determines the 
strength of peer effects in a social network. Social status is a special variable that is quite 
different from other individual characteristics. Specifically, it captures important features 
of the social network, i.e., the centrality of an individual in the network. In this paper, 
the measure of social status depends on the number of friend nominations from others. A 
 9 
 
more sophisticated measure of social status is the Katz-Bonacich centrality which 
accounts for the importance of an individual in the network, see Kats (1953); Bonacich 
(1987) for details. In the literature, social status plays an important role in the utility 
function. For example, Akerlof (1997) develops a status model in which status directly 
affects individuals’ utilities and analyzes how hierarchy affects decision makings. 
Becker et al. (2005) take status as a “status good” in the marginal utility of consumption 
-the higher the status, the larger the marginal consumption utility. Ball et al. (2001) use 
an experimental design to study how social status affects bargaining payoffs and find 
that players with high status always obtain more surpluses. In our setting, social status 
affects the utility function through the interaction strength α. The interaction strength not 
only depends on her own social status, but also the status of her friends. In other words, 
the social interactions depend on the structure of the network and its hierarchy. Namely, 
hierarchy is the distribution of the social status in the network. Theoretically, peer effects 
should be monotonely increasing in friends’ social status 𝑆𝑗 but decreasing in own status 
𝑆𝑖. In particular, social interactions are asymmetric, i.e., 𝛼�⋅, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� ≠ 𝛼�⋅, 𝑆𝑗 , 𝑆𝑖� when 
𝑆𝑖 ≠ 𝑆𝑗. Figure 2 illustrates the idea of hierarchy effects. 
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Figure 2 Hierarchy Effects 
 
 
 
2.2.2. Direct and Indirect Peer Effects 
In the specification of our utility function, we deploy the local interaction setting 
and the direct social interactions only occur among friends. However, the interactions 
could transmit through individual and the individuals can affect each other indirectly. 
For example, let𝑗 ∉  𝐹𝑖 , but 𝑘 ∈ 𝐹𝑖 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝑘. Then the choice of individual 𝑗 affects 
𝑘′𝑠 utility, hence 𝑖 needs to consider the possibility of 𝑗′𝑠 choice if 𝑖 wants to take 𝑘′𝑠 
choice into account. Given the structure of the social network, strategic effects pass 
through friends, friends of friends, etc., and finally, reach the whole network in 
equilibrium. An important property of such indirect strategic effects is that under weak 
and primitive conditions introduced later, these effects decay with the network distance, 
i.e. a condition called network stability condition (NSC), see Xu (2011). Under NSC, the 
dependence between any two individuals’ choices vanishes as the network distance 
between them increases. 
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The indirect peer effects have been explicitly studied in the theoretic network 
literature, e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In equilibrium, these indirect peer effects 
pervade the large network in local interaction models, e.g. Ellison (1993) and Özgür 
(2011). In our setting, the parameter of interest is: for 𝑦 = 0,1 and 𝑠, 𝑠′ = 𝐿,𝐻, 
𝛼(𝑦, 𝑠,𝐻) − 𝛼(𝑦, 𝑠, 𝐿) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼(1, 𝑠, 𝑠′) − 𝛼(0, 𝑠, 𝑠′) 
which quantify the hierarchy effects and peer effects, respectively. Figure 3 illustrates 
the ideas of indirect and direct effects. 
 
 
Figure 3 Individual j Has Indirect Effect on Individual i Through Individual k. 
 
 
2.3. CHARACTERIZE BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
We now characterize the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the social network game 
where individuals make binary choices simultaneously. In particular we will show that 
BNE exists and is unique under weak conditions. More importantly, we will also 
establish a property of equilibrium strategies, denoted as “network stability”. Such a 
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property is important for our asymptotic analysis. To proceed, we first characterize the 
BNE solution to our game. We make the following assumptions for our discussion. 
Assumption 1. Let 𝜖𝑖 be i.i.d. across players and conform to the logistic distribution, i.e. 
𝐹𝜖𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑡/(1 + 𝑒𝑡). 
Assumption 1 is standard in binary responses models. Similar assumptions can also 
be found in the empirical game literature, e.g. Brock and Durlauf (2001); Bajari et al. 
(2010) and Xu (2011). As we will see later, assumption 1 helps provide a closed form 
for choice probabilities in terms of best responses. However, this distributional 
assumption is not essential and our results can also generalize to other distributions in 
the exponential family, e.g., normal distribution. 
Assumption 2. Let maxi∈I ∑ ℓ𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑀𝑗 , where 𝑀 is a natural number and invariant with 
𝑛. 
Assumption 2 requires that the number of friends to be less than a fixed number no 
matter how large is the social network, in particular, when the number of individuals in 
the network goes to infinity in our asymptotic analysis. By such a condition, we rule out 
the case that the network is highly centralized, e.g. “Star Network”. In our dataset from 
the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), each student has at 
most 10 friends. Therefore 𝑀 = 10 in our empirical study. 
Assumption 3. Let λ = maxs,s′ |𝛼(1, 𝑠, 𝑠′) − 𝛼(0, 𝑠, 𝑠′)| × M4 < 1.  
Assumption 3 amounts to the unit root restriction in time series and limit the 
strength of social interactions. With such a restriction, the dependence among 
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equilibrium decisions would satisfy the mixing conditions for dependent data. Similar 
assumptions can also be found in Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Xu (2011). 
Let Wn = {(𝑋1,𝑆1,𝐹1),⋯ , (Xn,𝑆𝑛,𝐹n)} be all the public information in the game 
and θ = (α,β) be the parameters of interest. By the BNE solution concept, individual i′s 
equilibrium decision can be written as Yi = 𝑟𝑖∗(𝑊𝑛, 𝜖𝑖) , where r𝑖∗  is the equilibrium 
strategy satisfying the mutual consistency conditions from the BNE solution concept. 
Namely, 
ri∗(𝑊𝑛, 𝜖𝑖) = 1�𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + �𝔼�𝛼�𝑟𝑗∗, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗��𝑊𝑛, 𝜖𝑖�
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
− 𝜖𝑖 ≥ 0\𝐵𝑖𝑔� 
Because 𝑟𝑖
∗ is binary valued, we have 
𝔼�𝛼�𝑟𝑗
∗, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗��𝑊𝑛, 𝜖𝑖� = 𝔼�𝛼�𝑟𝑗∗, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗��𝑊𝑛�= 𝛼�1, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� ⋅ 𝑃�𝑟𝑗∗(𝑊𝑛, 𝜖𝑗) = 1�𝑊𝑛� + 𝛼�0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗�
⋅ 𝑃�𝑟𝑗
∗(𝑊𝑛, 𝜖𝑗) = 0�𝑊𝑛� 
where the first step comes from the i.i.d. condition in assumption 1. 
Denote 𝑝𝑖(𝑊𝑛;𝜃) = 𝑃�𝑟𝑗∗(𝑊𝑛, 𝜖𝑗) = 1�𝑊𝑛� . By assumption 1, we have 
𝑝𝑖(𝑊𝑛;𝜃) = exp[𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + ∑ 𝛼(0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗)𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� ⋅ 𝑝𝑗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃)𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 ] 1 + exp[𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + ∑ 𝛼(0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗)𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� ⋅ 𝑝𝑗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃)𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 ]            (2) 
where 𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� = 𝛼�1, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� − 𝛼�0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗�. 
Let 𝑃𝑛(𝑊𝑛;𝜃) = � 𝑝1(𝑊𝑛;𝜃),⋯ , 𝑝𝑛(𝑊𝑛;𝜃)�′  . Further we define the best response 
function as follows: for each 𝑝 = (𝑝1,⋯ ,𝑝𝑛) ∈ [0,1]𝑛, 
Γ𝑖(𝑝,𝑊𝑛;𝜃) = exp[𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + ∑ 𝛼(0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗)𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗�𝑝𝑗𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 ] 1 + exp[𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + ∑ 𝛼(0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗)𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗�𝑝𝑗𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 ]  
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Let further Γ = (Γ1,⋯ , Γ𝑛)′. Then a solution 𝑃𝑛∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃) to equation (2) can be rewritten 
as a fixed point of the following equation in 𝑝 ∈ [0,1]𝑛: 
𝑝 = Γ(𝑝,𝑊𝑛;𝜃) 
The existence of a solution to equation (2) has been guaranteed by the Brouwer’s fixed 
point theorem; see, e.g., Bajari et al. (2010) for a similar result. Under assumptions 1 to 
3, we can further obtain the uniqueness of the BNE solution. 
Theorem 1. Under assumptions 1 to 3, there exists a unique pure strategy BNE for any 
n. 
Proof. See Appendix B.1. 
In this paper, we restrict ourselves to a unique BNE. Without assumptions 1 to 3, 
there may be multiple equilibria. In such a case, an obvious obstacle is the 
incompleteness of the econometrics model, i.e. each value of the structural parameter θ 
could deliver more than one observations of the decisions on the social network. Then 
what we observe in the data is some mixture of several equilibrium distributions of 
observables. For our network game with large number of players, it is difficulty to 
incorporate multiple equilibria and apply partial identification approach. For more 
discussions on this issue, see e.g. Tamer (2003). 
 
2.4. IDENTIFICATION 
In this section we consider semiparametric identification of the structural parameter 
𝜃 . The definition of identification of the game model follows Hurwicz (1950) and 
Koopmans and Reiersøl (1950). Specifically, given the joint distribution of 𝐹𝑌1 ,⋯,𝑌𝑛|𝑊𝑛 , 
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can we uniquely derive the structural parameter 𝜃? If the answer is “yes”, thenwe obtain 
identification of the structural model; otherwise, the model is not identified. 
Our identification is constructive, similar as that of Robinson (1988). Let Δ(𝑊𝑛) =ln𝔼[𝑌𝑖|𝑊𝑛] − ln{1 − 𝔼[𝑌𝑖|𝑊𝑛]} be the difference between the logarithm probabilities of 
choosing 1 and 0. Because Δ(𝑊𝑛)  is derived from 𝔼[𝑌𝑖|𝑊𝑛]  and then from the 
distribution 𝐹𝑌1,⋯,𝑌𝑛|𝑊𝑛 , we can takeΔ(𝑊𝑛)  as a known object in our identification 
analysis. 
Note that 𝑝𝑖(𝑊𝑛;𝜃) can be identified by 𝔼[𝑌𝑖|𝑊𝑛] through Theorem 1. Moreover, 
by equation (2), we have 
Δ(𝑊𝑛) = 𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + �{𝛼(0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗)
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
+ 𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� ⋅ 𝑝𝑗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃)}                                              (3) 
For notational simplicity, we discuss identification by focusing on the case where 𝑆𝑖 is 
binary. In particular, 𝑆𝑖 takes binary values: 𝑆𝑖 ∈ {𝐿,𝐻} where L and H represent the low 
and high social status position, respectively. Then, we can rewrite Δ(𝑊𝑛) as 
Δ(𝑊𝑛) = 𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + � 𝛼(0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑠)𝑍𝛼𝑖𝑠
𝑠∈{𝐿,𝐻} + � 𝛾(𝑆𝑖, 𝑠)𝑍𝛾𝑖𝑠𝑠∈{𝐿,𝐻}                                             (4) 
where 𝑍𝛼𝑖𝑠 = ∑ 1{𝑆𝑗 = 𝑠}𝑗∈𝐹𝑖   and 𝑍𝛾𝑖𝑠 = ∑ 1�𝑆𝑗 = 𝑠�𝔼[𝑌𝑗|𝑊𝑛]𝑗∈𝐹𝑖  for s = L, H. Note 
that 𝑍𝛾𝑖𝑠is can also be obtained from the distribution of the observables, 𝐹𝑌1,⋯,𝑌𝑛|𝑊𝑛 and 
𝑍𝛼𝑖𝑠  is simply a transformation of the observables. Fix 𝑥 ∈ 𝒮X and 𝑠 ∈ {𝐿,𝐻}. For all 
𝑤 ∈ 𝒮𝑊𝑛|𝑋𝑖=𝑥, 𝑆𝑖=𝑠, note that equation (4) becomes 
𝔼[Δ(𝑊𝑛)|𝑊𝑛 = 𝑤] = 𝛽(𝑥) + � {𝛼(0, 𝑠, 𝑠′)𝑧𝛼𝑖𝑠 + 𝛾(𝑠, 𝑠′)𝑧𝛾𝑖𝑠
𝑠′∈{𝐿,𝐻} } 
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where 𝑧𝛼𝑖𝑠′ = ∑ 1{𝑆𝑗 = 𝑠′}𝑗∈𝐹𝑖   and 𝑧𝛾𝑖𝑠′ = ∑ 1�𝑆𝑗 = 𝑠′�𝔼[𝑌𝑗|𝑊𝑛]𝑗∈𝐹𝑖  Therefore, when 
the support 𝒮𝑊𝑛|𝑋𝑖=𝑥, 𝑆𝑖=𝑠 is rich enough, we obtain the identification for the coefficients, 
𝛽(𝑥), 𝛼(0, 𝑠, 𝑠′) and 𝛾(𝑠, 𝑠′) as if in a linear model. 
Formally, we summarize the above discussion in the following theorem. To begin 
with, let 𝑍𝑖 = (1,𝑍𝛼𝑖𝐿 ,𝑍𝛼𝑖𝐻 ,𝑍𝛾𝑖𝐿,𝑍𝛾𝑖𝐻)′. We now impose the following rank condition 
on the support 𝒮𝑊𝑛|𝑋𝑖=𝑥, 𝑆𝑖=𝑠. 
Assumption 4. (No multicollinearity) Let 𝔼[𝑍𝑖𝑍𝑖′|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥, 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑠] have the full rank for 
all 𝑥 ∈ 𝒮𝑋 and 𝑠 ∈ {𝐿,𝐻}. 
To satisfy assumption 4, (𝑋𝑗, 𝑆𝑗) need to have variations while conditioning on 𝑋𝑖 
and 𝑆𝑖 which effectively changes the equilibrium choice probabilities of individual 𝑖′𝑠 
friends. Moreover, assumption 4 also implicitly requires that the number of friends (NF), 
i.e.,𝑁𝐹𝑖 = ∑ ℓ𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 , has variation. This is due to the fact that 𝑍𝛼𝑖𝐿  +  𝑍𝛼𝑖𝐻  =  𝑁𝐹𝑖  . 
For 𝑠 ∈ {𝐿,𝐻}, let 𝛼(𝑠) = [𝛼(0, 𝑠, 𝐿),𝛼(0, 𝑠,𝐻)]′ and  𝛾(𝑠) = [𝛾(𝑠, 𝐿), 𝛾(𝑠,𝐻)]′. In 
the next theorem, we provide the identification of�𝛼(𝑠),𝛽(𝑥),𝛾(𝑠)�. Because 𝑥 and 𝑠 
are arbitrary, thus we establish the identification of 𝜃. 
Theorem 2. Suppose assumptions 1 to 4 hold. For any 𝑥 and 𝑠, 𝛽(𝑥),𝛼(𝑠)′, 𝛾(𝑠)′)′ is 
identified by 
𝛽(𝑥),𝛼(𝑠)′, 𝛾(𝑠)′)′ = {𝔼[𝑍𝑖𝑍𝑖′|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥, 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑠]}−1𝔼[𝑍𝑖Δ(𝑊𝑛)|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥, 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑠]              (5)  
Proof. The proof directly follows our discussions above, and hence is omitted. 
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2.5. ESTIMATION 
In this section, we propose a simple estimation procedure called nested pseudo 
likelihood approach, which is motivated from Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). 
Intuitively, the difficulties in our setting come from the computational burden of solving 
the equilibrium of the large network game, which is quite similar to the dynamic game in 
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). Later, we illustrate this approach by using Monte Carlo 
experiments.  
Consider a sample {(Yi,𝑋𝑖,𝐹𝑖, 𝑆𝑖): 𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑛} from a large social network. Note 
that all the data come from only one game, instead of from repetitions of the same small 
game. Moreover, our asymptotic analysis relies on the number of individuals in the 
network going to infinity, which has a similar flavor to the analysis in time series and 
spatial econometrics. In empirical studies, clearly our approach can be applied to the 
case where all observations come from a small number of networks and each network 
contains a large number of individuals.  
For our estimation, we employ a parametric linear–index setting: Ui1 = 𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + ��𝛼�0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� + 𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗�𝑝𝑗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃)�
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
− 𝜖𝑖                                                  (6) 
where β ∈ ℝd . Note that we can take this setting as a natural extension of the single-
agent Logit model, i.e. α(y, s, s′) = 0 for all y, s and s′. Moreover, let 
γ = �γ(L, L), γ(L, H), γ(H, L), γ(H, H)�′, 
α = �α(0, L, L),α(0, L, H),α(0, H, L),α(0, H, H )�′. 
 18 
 
For notational simplicity, we denote θ0 = (α0′ ,𝛽0′ , 𝛾0′)′ ∈ Θ ⊆ ℝd+dsas the underlying 
true parameter, and θ = (𝛼′,𝛽′, 𝛾′)′ as a generic parameter in Θ. In our setting of two 
status, ds = 8. Recall that the main objective of our interest are the hierarchy effects and 
peer effects, which now become α0(⋅,⋅, H)  −  α0(·,·, L)  and γ0 , respectively, in this 
parametric setup.  
The unique equilibrium in Theorem 1 is crucial for our estimation analysis. In 
addition, we need to strengthen assumption 3 to rule out multiple equilibria for all Θ. 
Assumption 5. For all θ ∈ Θ, let 
λ = max
s,s′∈{L,H}|𝛾(𝑠, 𝑠′)| × 𝑀4 < 1 
In the Add Health dataset, we have M = 10. Therefore, we need to restrict our 
parameter space for any analysis based on Add Health dataset by γ(s, s′) ∈ (−0.4,0.4) 
for all s and s′. 
Lemma 1. Under assumptions 1, 2 and 5, the network game has a unique BNE for all n 
and 𝜃 ∈ 𝛩.  
The proof of Lemma 1 directly follows Theorem 1, and hence is omitted. For the 
purpose of comparison, here we first introduce the maximum likelihood estimator 
(MLE), which is the most efficient under regularity conditions, but impractical due to its 
heavy computational burden in large network games. In contrast, our NPLE is relatively 
easy to execute and its standard error can obtain in a direct manner. 
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2.5.1. Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
Under the uniqueness of the equilibrium in Theorem 1, Pn∗ (W𝑛;  θ) is well defined. 
Now we are ready to define the likelihood function. For each θ ∈ Θ, letLi(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃) =
𝑌𝑖 ln 𝑝𝑖∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃) + (1 − 𝑌𝑖) ln 1 − 𝑝𝑖∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃) be the log-likelihood of individual i’s choice 
(conditional on Wn). Note that the log-likelihood of observation i depends not only on (Yi, Xi, Si, Fi), but also on (X−i, S−i, F−i), which is due to the strategic effects among 
individuals. Let 
L(θ; n) = 𝔼 �1n�𝐿𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃)𝑛
𝑖=1
� = 𝔼[𝐿𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃)] 
be the population log-likelihood of the game model with n individuals, where the second 
equality comes from the implicitly assumption that all individuals are created equal on 
the network before its realization. Given the identification and regularity conditions, θ0 
maximizes L(·;  n) for every n by a standard argument for MLE. 
Following Xu (2011), the MLE is defined as follows: 
𝜃�𝑀𝐿𝐸 = arg max
θ∈Θ
 𝐿𝑛(𝜃) 
where Ln(θ) = 1n  ∑ Li(Yi, Wn;  θ)𝑛𝑖=1  . The difference between L(θ;  n)  and Ln(θ)  is 
essential: L(θ;  n)  is a deterministic function of θ  that represents population log-
likelihood of our n-individual network game, while Ln(θ) is a random function of θ that 
is a sample analog of L(θ;  n) . Next lemma provides consistency and asymptotic 
normality for  𝜃�MLE. 
Assumption 6. There exists a non-singular (𝑑 +  𝑑𝑠)  × (𝑑 +  𝑑𝑠) matrix 𝐼𝜃0, such that 
 20 
 
𝔼 �
𝜕
𝜕𝜃
𝐿𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃) × 𝜕𝜕𝜃′ 𝐿𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃)� → 𝐼𝜃0 
Assumption 7. 𝒮𝑋 is bounded and 𝛩 is compact.  
Assumption 8. 𝜃0 is an interior point of 𝛩. 
The matrix Iθ0  is the Fisher information when the number of players goes to 
infinity. The non-singularity condition of Iθ0  as well as assumptions 7 and 8 are standard 
in the MLE literature.  
Lemma 2. Under conditions assumptions 1, 2 and 5 to 7, we have  𝜃�𝑀𝐿𝐸
𝑝
→ 𝜃0 . 
Moreover, suppose assumption 8 holds. Then 
√𝑛(𝜃�𝑀𝐿𝐸 − 𝜃0) 𝑑→ 𝑁(0, 𝐼𝜃0−1) 
Proof. The proof obtains by a similar argument in Xu (2011), and hence is omitted here. 
Though the most efficient, the MLE is extremely difficult to compute in a large 
network: for each iteration under a parameter value θ, we need to solve the fixed point in 
an n–individual game where n is large. In this paper, we suggest a different estimation 
procedure, called as “nested pseudo likelihood” (NPL), which is simple to implement 
and provides standard error of the estimator directly. The proposed estimation method is 
attractive from a practitioner’s perspective.  
In a seminal paper, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) introduced NPLE for estimating 
dynamic discrete games that also involve computational difficulties of obtaining an 
equilibrium in a Bayesian game with infinite time horizon. For the same reason, by using 
the nested pseudo likelihood algorithm we can avoid to compute fixed points in a large 
vector space. 
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2.5.2. Nested Pseudo Likelihood Estimation 
To define NPLE, we first introduce some notation. Let qi(Yi, Wn;  θ, Pn) =  Yi ln Γ𝑖(𝑃𝑛,𝑊𝑛;𝜃)  + (1 − Yi) ln(1 − Γ𝑖(𝑃𝑛,𝑊𝑛;𝜃)) 
be the pseudo log-likelihood of individual i’s  choice (conditional on Wn ). In the 
definition of qi , Γi  is not the equilibrium choice probability, but the best response 
function. Moreover Pn  is a generic choice probability profile instead of the actual 
equilibrium choice probability profile. In this sense, qi is a pseudo log-likelihood 
function. Let further 
Qn(𝜃,𝑃𝑛) = 1𝑛�𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)𝑛
𝑖=1
 
When Pn = Pn∗(Wn;  θ0) , Qn�·, Pn∗(Wn;  θ0)�  becomes a true likelihood function of θ , 
which is maximized at θ0. It should also be noted that Ln(θ) =  Qn�θ, Pn∗(Wn;  θ)�. 
Following Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), we now define the NPLE using an 
iteractive algorithm, which begins with an arbitrary initial guess P𝑛(0) for Pn∗(Wn;  θ0). 
Note that P𝑛(0) need not be a consistent estimator of Pn∗(Wn;  θ0). For example, we could 
take P𝑛(0) = (0,⋯ ,0)′. Formally, the NPL algorithm is described as follows: 
Step 1: Let 
𝜃�(1) = arg max
𝜃∈Θ
𝑄𝑛�𝜃,𝑃𝑛(0)�, 
Pn(1) = Γ�𝑃𝑛(0),𝑊𝑛;𝜃�(1)� 
Step 2: This step is an iterative procedure: for k ≥ 2, let 
𝜃�(𝑘) = arg max
𝜃∈Θ
𝑄𝑛�𝜃,𝑃𝑛(𝑘−1)�, 
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Pn(k) = Γ�𝑃𝑛(𝑘−1),𝑊𝑛;𝜃�(𝑘)� 
This procedure stops at the K − th  iteration when ∥ 𝜃�(K) − 𝜃�(𝐾−1) ∥  is less than a 
predetermined tolerance, e.g. 10−6. 
Step 3: Let  𝜃�(K) be our NPLE, i.e.  𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿 = 𝜃�(𝐾). Moreover, let  𝑃�𝑛 = P𝑛(K). 
As also pointed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), in general it is unclear whether 
the NPL algorithm converges or not. Therefore, we investigate this issue by using Monte 
Carlo experiments, in which the NPL algorithm converges well. By definition, our 
NPLE is essentially a fixed point estimator that we obtain using the proposed iterative 
algorithm if it converges. Specifically, the fixed point is defined in the following 
equation system in �𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿,𝑃�𝑛�: 
𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿 = arg max
𝜃∈Θ
𝑄𝑛(𝜃,𝑃�𝑛)   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑃�𝑛 = Γ�𝑃�𝑛,𝑊𝑛;𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿�                                                       (7) 
See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) for more details. The motivation for NPLE comes 
from the following observation: let Q(θ, Pn; n)  = 𝔼Q𝑛(θ, Pn) be the population objective 
function. Because Q(·, Pn∗ (Wn;  θ0);  n) is an actual likelihood function of θ in which Pn∗ (Wn;  θ0)  is the underlying choice probability profile derived from equilibrium 
conditions, then θ0 maximizes Q(·, Pn∗ (Wn;  θ0);  n) for all n, i.e. 
𝜃0 = arg max
𝜃∈Θ
𝑄(𝜃,𝑃𝑛;𝑛)   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑃𝑛 = Γ(𝑃n,𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)                                                              (8) 
The above discussion is summarized by the following lemma.  
Lemma 3. Suppose regular conditions in the MLE hold. For any n, 𝜃0  solves the 
following equation 
𝜃 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜃′∈𝛩
𝑄(𝜃′,𝑃𝑛∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃);𝑛)                                                                                            (9) 
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Proof. See Appendix B.2. 
2.5.3. Consistency 
To establish the consistency, we need to make an additional assumption. Note that 
equation (9) might admits multiple solutions, which means that θ0 is not identified by 
the pseudo likelihood function. For this reason, we simply rule out such a possibility by 
the following assumption.  
Assumption 9. 𝜃0 uniquely solves the following equation  
𝜃 = 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑛→∞
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜃′∈𝛩
𝑄(𝜃′,𝑃𝑛∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃);𝑛)                                                                                 (10) 
Assumption 9 implicitly requires that the population objective function Q(·, Pn∗ (Wn;  θ);  n) converges to some limit function of θ′. The limit is taken over the 
number of individuals in the network which is the sample size. The existence of such a 
limit is due to the fact that as n increases, the equilibrium choice probability of any given 
individual i will converges to its limit. This is because the additional individuals will be 
located farther away from i in the network under our assumption 2. See Appendix A.2 
for a discussion on the network stability condition. Assumption 9 can be replaced by a 
weaker assumption that θ0  is a unique solution in an open ball around it, see 
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) for more details. Hiroyuki and Shimotsu (2012) discuss 
a local condition under which the NPL estimator is consistent. The condition is a local 
contraction property and they also propose a modified equilibrium update rule to obtain 
a better contraction property and more consistent NPL estimator.  
Given the conditions specified above, we show that the NPLE is consistent.  
Theorem 3. Suppose assumptions 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 9 hold. Then  𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿
𝑝
→ 𝜃0. 
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Proof. See Appendix B.3. 
2.5.4. Asymptotic Normality 
Here we derive the limiting distribution for our NPLE. For the illustration purpose, 
we also investigate the asymptotic properties of the ML estimator as well as the pseudo 
maximum likelihood estimator (PMLE). Following Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), the 
PMLE is defined as follows 𝜃�PMLE  = arg max𝜃∈Θ Qn�θ, Pn∗ (Wn;  θ0)� . Note that 
PMLE is an infeasible estimator since Pn∗ (Wn;  θ0)  is unknown while MLE is not 
practical due to its heavy computational burden. To proceed, we first examine the FOCs 
for these three estimators. 
NPLE:  
𝜕𝑄𝑛�𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿,𝑃𝑛∗�𝑊𝑛;𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿��
𝜕𝜃
= 0 
PMLE: 
𝜕𝑄𝑛�𝜃�𝑃𝑀𝐿,𝑃𝑛∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�
𝜕𝜃
= 0 
MLE:  
𝜕𝑄𝑛�𝜃�𝑀𝐿𝐸,𝑃𝑛∗�𝑊𝑛;𝜃�𝑀𝐿𝐸��
𝜕𝜃
+ 𝜕𝑄𝑛�𝜃�𝑀𝐿𝐸,𝑃𝑛∗�𝑊𝑛;𝜃�𝑀𝐿𝐸��
𝜕𝑃𝑛
⋅
𝜕𝑃𝑛∗�𝑊𝑛;𝜃�𝑀𝐿𝐸�
𝜕𝜃
= 0 
Clearly, the differences are essential: compared with the PMLE, the NPLE 
introduces an additional bias through the choice probability profile Pn∗�Wn;𝜃�NPL�. The 
MLE differs from the NPLE in the sense that θ affects equilibrium choice probabilities 
of friends. Moreover, these three FOCs reflect the different amount of information used 
in these likelihood approaches. Specifically, the PMLE exploits information contained in 
the partial equilibrium by using the best response equations on the equilibrium path 
while the MLE is indeed a general equilibrium approach. Further, we view our NPLE as 
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a method in between. Next, we establish the asymptotic normality for our NPL estimator. 
To begin with, we make the following assumption. 
Assumption 10. There exist non-singular (d + ds) × (d + ds)  matrices V1(θ0)  and V2(θ0) such that  
−𝔼 �
∂2𝑄𝑛�𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�
∂θ∂θ′
�𝑊𝑛�
𝑝
→ 𝑉1(𝜃0) 
𝔼 �
∂2𝑄𝑛�𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�
∂θ ∂Pn ⋅ 𝜕𝑃𝑛∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)𝜕𝜃′ �𝑊𝑛� 𝑝→ 𝑉2(𝜃0) 
Moreover, V(θ0) = V1(θ0)  −  V2(θ0) is positive definite. 
Assumption 10 is a high level condition which imposes restrictions on the sequence 
of networks (indexed by the number of individuals) in the asymptotic analysis. Such a 
condition could be derived from primitive assumptions on Wn, e.g. Xi are i.i.d. and the 
distribution of the number of friends NFi converges to some limiting distribution as n 
goes to infinity. In our setting, we can express the conditions in assumption 10 in a more 
explicit manner. To illustrate, we first introduce some notation. For s, s′ ∈  {L, H}, let Zαiss′∗  =  Zαis′  ·  1{Si  =  s}, Zγiss′∗  =  Zγis  ·  1{Si  =  s}.  Let further Xαi∗  =( ZαiLL∗ , ZαiLH∗ , ZαiHL∗ , ZαiHH∗ ) , Xβi∗  =  X𝑖′  , Xγi∗  = � ZγiLL∗ , ZγiLH∗ , ZγiHL∗ , ZγiHH∗ � , and Xi∗  =  (Xαi∗ , Xβi∗ , Xγi∗  )′. First, note that 
𝔼 �
∂2𝑄𝑛�𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�
∂θ∂θ′
�𝑊𝑛� = −𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑟 �∂𝑄𝑛�𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�∂θ �𝑊𝑛� 
where the first equality comes from the conditional independence, the second step comes 
from information equality and the last equality comes use zero conditional mean. 
Furthermore, with simple calculation, we have 
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∂𝑄𝑛�𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�
∂θ
= 1
𝑛
�𝑋𝑖
∗�𝑌𝑖 − pi∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Therefore  
𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟 �
∂𝑄𝑛�𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�
∂θ
�𝑊𝑛� = 1𝑛�𝑋𝑖∗𝑋𝑖∗′𝑝𝑖∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�1 − pi∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Theorem 4. Suppose assumptions 1, 2, 5 and 7 to 10 hold, we have  
√n� 𝜃�NPL − θ0� 𝑑→  N�0,Ω(θ0)� ,  
Ω(θ0) = V−1(𝜃0) ⋅ 𝑉1(𝜃0) ⋅ V−1(𝜃0) 
Proof. See Appendix B.4. 
2.5.5. Simulation-Based Estimation of Variance-Covariance Matrix 
In this subsection, we provide a simulation-based method to consistently estimate 
the first derivative of choice probabilities respect to the parameter, 
𝜕𝑃𝑛∗(Wn;θ0)
𝜕𝜃
. After we 
obtain our NPL estimator  𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿, we draw a sequence of parameters from a small open 
ball of 𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿  and denote them as {θi}𝑖=1T  by θi = 𝜃�NPL  +  εi  where εi  is drawn from a 
uniform distribution on [−a, a] . With each θi,  we compute the choice probabilities 
through best response function, i.e., Sn(i) = Γ(Pn∗ , Wn;  θi). Therefore we have 
Sn(𝑖) − 𝑃𝑛∗ = 𝜕𝑃𝑛∗�Wn;𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿�𝜕𝜃 �𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿� + 𝜉𝑖 
Therefore we have our estimator of the variance-covariance matrix: 
𝜕𝑃𝑛∗��Wn;𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿�
𝜕𝜃
= �1
𝑇
�𝑆𝑛
(𝑖)�𝜃𝑖 − 𝑃�𝑁𝑃𝐿�𝑇
𝑖=1
� �
1
𝑇
��𝜃𝑖 − 𝑃�𝑁𝑃𝐿��𝜃𝑖 − 𝑃�𝑁𝑃𝐿�
′
𝑇
𝑖=1
�
−1
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With consistency of θ�𝑁𝑃𝐿  and arbitrarily small a , we can easily show that 
𝜕𝑃𝑛
∗��Wn;𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿�
𝜕𝜃
 is a consistent estimator for 𝜕𝑃𝑛∗(Wn;𝜃0)
𝜕𝜃
. Therefore we can obtain consistent 
estimator for Ω through such a simulation-based method. 
2.5.6. Testing Hierarchy Effects 
It is interesting to look at the asymmetry in social interactions which captures the 
hierarchy effects. Intuitively, we expect that high status friends would have larger peer 
effects. Through all results established above, we are able to quantify the hierarch effects 
of how large is the gap between peer effects from friends of different status. We 
formally write out the null hypothesis as follows H0:𝛼(𝑦, 𝑠,𝐻) − 𝛼(𝑦, 𝑠, 𝐿) = 0,𝑦 = 0,1; 𝑠 = 𝐿,𝐻 
Based on Theorem 4, we can construct standard Wald-style test for above null 
hypotheses. With consistent estimators for both parameters and their standard error, we 
can detect the size of the hierarchy effects and how significant they are. This is 
important for policy analysis on how to targeting and reconstructing the network 
structure on some goals, e.g, fairness. 
2.6. MONTE CARLO EXPERIMENTS 
In this section we present evidence for the performance of the NPL estimators in a 
simple school network on college attendance decision. For student i, the utility from 
attending college is Xi′β +  ∑ 𝔼(𝛼(𝑌𝑗 , 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗)𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 + ϵ𝑖  where Yj  denotes the college 
attendance decision of student j. The utility of not attending college is normalized to zero. 
Each student i is associated with a social status, H or L, decided by number of friend 
nominations from other students. The true parameter of exogenous effect is invariant 
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across the different Monte Carlo experiments, i.e. β0 = −4. To illustrate how our NPL 
estimator performs with different hierarchy effects, we execute three experiments with 
true interactions parameters set as follows Monte Carlo I: {α0 = (0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4)  and  γ0 = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4)} Monte Carlo II: {α0 = (0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1)  and  γ0 = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4)} Monte Carlo I: {α0 = (0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1)  and  γ0 = (0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1)} 
Experiment I has both heterogenous peer effects and hierarchy effects. Experiment II 
imposes homogenous hierarchy effects while Experiment III take peer effects as 
homoegenous. Xi  is drawn from standard uniform distribution and ϵi conforms to 
standard Logistic distribution. With randomly drawn Xi, 𝜖𝑖 and the true parameter, we 
solve the unique equilibrium, Pn∗. Then we calculate Yi through 
Yi = 1�𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + ��𝛼�0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� + 𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� ⋅ 𝑝𝑗∗ + 𝜖𝑖�
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
> 0� 
where Yi = 1  denotes “attend college” and Yi = 0  otherwise. By construction, the 
conditional independence, unique equilibrium, and rank conditions are all satisfied by 
these designs. From our asymptotic results of  θ�𝑁𝑃𝐿, we know that MSE = Op �1𝑛� and SD = Op � 1√𝑛� . Therefore, with {(Yi, Xi, Si, Fi)}i=1𝑛 , we implement our nested pseudo 
likelihood algorithm to estimate the parameter of interest. For each experiment design, 
we simulate NR = 1000 samples and calculate summary statistics from empirical 
distribution of estimators θ�𝑁𝑃𝐿 from these samples. We focus on three statistics: mean, 
standard deviation (SD) and mean squared error (MSE). MSE is estimated using the 
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estimators and the knowledge of our true parameters in the setting. In each Monte Carlo 
experiment, we consider three different number of individuals, n = 1200, 2400, 4800 to 
investigate at the orders of MSE and standard deviation. Table 1 reports performance of 
θ�𝑁𝑃𝐿 in the designwith heterogenous peer effects and hierarchy effects in terms of mean 
and standard deviation. For all three sample sizes, the means of θ�𝑁𝑃𝐿 are quite close to 
the true parameter which confirm the consistency. The MSE in Table 2 is halved when 
the sample size doublewhich is in accordance with the order from the asymptotic 
properties, i.e. MSE = Op �1𝑛�. The standard errors are with reasonable size for discrete 
choice model. We compare our results with that of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) 
which execute the Monte Carlo simulations with size sample equal 2000. Our results 
with n = 2400 quite similar as that of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) in terms of 
standard error. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) consider the oligopolistic competition 
and the validity of NPL estimation comes from the independent market assumption. In 
our social network scenario, this independence condition is violated; however, we 
recover the validity from the incompleteness of the social network and the constraint on 
the number of friends. 
Table 3 reports performance of θ�𝑁𝑃𝐿 in a setting that homogenous peer effects from 
null action, y =  0 and heterogenous peer effects from y =  1. The summary statistics 
are similar as those from fully heterogenous setting in experiment I: the mean is close to 
the true parameter, the MSE in Table 4 is with order 1n and the standard error 
diminishes in a rate of 1 √n. In experiment III, we have that all peer effects are the same 
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and focus on the hierarchy effects. The results turn out to be as good as those from 
experiment I and II. We present those summary statistics in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
 
Table 1 Mean and Standard Deviation I 
n β� α� γ� 
1200 -4.045 0.097 0.209 0.297 0.412 0.107 0.194 0.312 0.391 
 -0.278* -0.187 -0.128 -0.180 -0.172 -0.467 -0.254 -0.477 -0.286 
2400 -4.023 0.093 0.198 0.300 0.402 0.112 0.211 0.308 0.403 
 -0.196 -0.139 -0.087 -0.126 -0.125 -0.348 -0.180 -0.334 -0.208 
4800 -4.010 0.099 0.202 0.300 0.401 0.104 0.196 0.308 0.400 
 -0.144 -0.096 -0.060 -0.085 -0.089 -0.242 -0.120 -0.224 -0.154 
*Standard Errors are denoted with italic font 
 
 
Table 2 Mean Square Error I 
n β� α� γ� 
1200  0.079  0.035  0.017  0.033  0.030  0.218  0.064  0.228  0.082  
2400  0.039  0.019  0.008  0.016  0.016  0.121  0.033  0.112  0.043  
4800  0.021  0.009  0.004  0.007  0.008  0.058  0.014  0.050  0.024  
 
Table 3 Mean and Standard Deviation II 
n β� α� γ� 
1200  -4.048  0.084  0.105  0.103  0.100  0.134  0.197  0.297  0.414  
 -0.309  -0.193  -0.102  -0.171  -0.143  -0.602  -0.311  -0.536  -0.354  
2400  -4.022  0.104  0.101  0.101  0.103  0.086  0.200  0.305  0.392  
 -0.213  -0.135  -0.073  -0.121  -0.102  -0.418  -0.222  -0.382  -0.253  
4800  -4.012  0.101  0.100  0.097  0.104  0.103  0.205  0.304  0.399  
 -0.152  -0.090  -0.051  -0.081  -0.070  -0.291  -0.157  -0.256  -0.176  
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Table 4 Mean Square Error II 
n β� α� γ� 
1200  0.098  0.037  0.011  0.029  0.020  0.363  0.097  0.287  0.126  
2400  0.046  0.018  0.005  0.015  0.010  0.175  0.049  0.146  0.064  
4800  0.023  0.008  0.003  0.007  0.005  0.085  0.025  0.066  0.031  
 
 
Table 5 Mean and Standard Deviation III 
n β� α� γ� 
1200  -4.021  0.098  0.205  0.304  0.399  0.107  0.092  0.097  0.106  
 
-0.276  -0.186  -0.118  -0.162  -0.155  -0.504  -0.274  -0.460  -0.313  
2400  -4.021  0.098  0.200  0.299  0.400  0.103  0.107  0.111  0.108  
 
-0.201  -0.133  -0.084  -0.120  -0.114  -0.351  -0.197  -0.336  -0.222  
4800  -4.014  0.101  0.203  0.298  0.403  0.101  0.098  0.107  0.101  
 
-0.149  -0.091  -0.057  -0.083  -0.081  -0.261  -0.134  -0.233  -0.154  
 
 
Table 6 Mean Square Error III 
n β� α� γ� 
1200  0.077  0.035  0.014  0.026  0.024  0.254  0.075  0.212  0.098  
2400  0.041  0.018  0.007  0.014  0.013  0.123  0.039  0.113  0.049  
4800  0.022  0.008  0.003  0.007  0.007  0.068  0.018  0.054  0.024  
 
 
2.7. COLLEGE ATTENDANCE 
In this section, we apply our model to study the college attendance decisions among 
high school student using Add Health dataset. Our results show that there are significant 
hierarchy effects in the peer effects of college attendance choices. Besides peer effects, 
the gpa is a key characteristics that affects the education decision. 
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2.7.1. Add Health Dataset 
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) is a 
longitudinal study of a nationally representative sample of adolescents in grades 7-12 in 
the United States during the 1994-95 school year. After the first wave, there are three 
following wave survey, keeping track on the adolescents which provides the college 
attendance data. Add Health combines longitudinal survey data on respondents’ social 
and economic features with contextual data on the family, friendships and peer groups. 
Therefore, this dataset provides unique opportunity to study peer effects and hierarchy 
effects. We are interested in the peer effects in decisions of whether continuing college 
education after graduation from high school. Whether there are asymmetric peer effects 
in students’ choice is interesting and meaningful for policy analysis. To be more specific, 
we are interested in the monotonicity of peer effect, i.e., the decisions of students with 
high status have larger impact on the choice of students in the low-status group. This 
monotonicity has policy implication that government could target on the high-status 
group to increase the whole enrollment rate of high school students. In the Add Health 
dataset, each student has nominations of at most five male friends and at most five 
female friends. This structure provides a social network with direct links. Though 
students have at most 10 out-links, they may have much more in-links. For instance, a 
student is attractive and nominated by 20 students as their friends, then this student has 
20 in-link. The in-link structure determines the hierarchy among students. We use 
demographic characteristics similar as those in the literature, see Dynarsky (2003); 
Linsenmeier et al. (2006); Garibaldi et al. (2012), such as age, household income, GPA, 
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parents’ education, race information, gender, etc. Table 7 summarizes the statistics of the 
college attendance variable and demographic variables. There are 4678 observations in 
the final analysis sample. The college enrollment rate was 57%. Though good dataset for 
peer effects study, Add Health dataset suffers from the same problem of survey data, e.g. 
for parents’ education, many respondents report 0 year education. For household income, 
respondents were likely to report much lower values. The main missing data issue for 
our analysis is the reluctance of nominations for best friends. Due to missing friendship, 
we combine four years high school students for our college attendance analysis. Our 
results may be biased due to the missing information of friendship and the not static 
setting of four years enrollment data. 
 
 
 
Table 7 Summary of Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 
Age 16.530  1.560  
Female 0.540  0.500  
Household Income 7.990  3.040  
Mother Education 0.660  2.010  
Father Education 1.910  3.180  
Overall GPA 2.510  0.800  
American Indian 0.040  0.190  
Asian 0.060  0.240  
Black 0.150  0.360  
Hispanic 0.160  0.370  
White 0.720  0.450  
College Attendance 0.570  0.490  
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2.7.2. Peer Effects in College Attendance 
We can easily imagine that when high school students make college attendance 
decision, the choices of their friends deliver impacts. Previous studies on college 
attendance investigate the effects of demographic characteristics as well as contextual 
variables, e.g. whether parents attended college, whether single-parent household, family 
size, female or male, family income, high school grade, whether minority, whether 
student aid, etc.( Manski and Wise (1983); Dynarsky (2003); Linsenmeier et al. (2006) 
to new only a few). However, the peer effects are not thoroughly studies in college 
attendance decision. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first one explicitly dealing 
with college attendance with comprehensive peer effects analysis. Table 8 reports the 
estimation results. We find that the overall GPA is the key factor that determines the 
college enrollment. This indicates that some high school students did not attend college 
because they did not receive any offer due to low GPA.  
The white students are less likely to attend college for advanced education. This 
may be due to the good outside options for white students. Female students are slightly 
less likely to attend college from our result which provides evidence of gender 
discrimination in the 90’s. An interesting finding from our result is that household 
income has small impact on college attendance. This provides evidence that students 
confronted less financial constraints. We also find that the older, the less probabilities to 
attend college which coincides with our intuition. The most important finding in our 
empirical study of college attendance is that there are strong hierarchy effects in peer 
effects. The peer effects from friends’ not attending college (Yj = 0) are all negative and 
 35 
 
the high status friends have much larger impact than low status students for the non-
action, i.e. 
α(0, L, H) = −1.038 
α(0, L, L) = −0.296, 
but similar effect from attending decision 
α(1, L, H) = 0.415 
α(1, L, L) = 0.403. 
We also find significant asymmetric peer effects that high status friends have stronger 
peer effects on low status students than vice versa, i.e. 
α(0, L, H) = −1.038 
α(0, H, L) = −0.120. 
Also, we have 
α(1, L, H) = 0.415 
α(1, H, L) = 0.276. 
To summarize, we find strong hierarchy effects that high status students delivers larger 
peer effects. Further, not attending college has stronger peer effects which support the 
strong peer effects on the negative side. Similar results are found in Carrell et al. (2013). 
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Table 8 Estimation Results 
Variable Estimator Std. Dev P-value 
Age -0.186  0.010  0.000  
Female -0.221  0.070  0.001  
Household Income 0.095  0.012  0.000  
Mother Education -0.017  0.016  0.311  
Father Education -0.013  0.011  0.213  
Overall 1.312  0.052  0.000  
American Indian -0.235  0.174  0.176  
Asian 0.026  0.175  0.883  
Black -0.045  0.140  0.747  
Hispanic -0.122  0.105  0.246  
White -0.532  0.119  0.000  
Peer Effects Estimator Std. Dev P-Value 
α(0, L, L) -0.296  0.298  0.322  
α(0, L, H) -1.038  0.325  0.001  
α(0, H, L) -0.120  0.498  0.809  
α(0, H, H)* 
   
γ(L, L) 0.699  0.478  0.144  
γ(L, H) 1.453  0.517  0.005  
γ(H, L) 0.396  0.836  0.636  
γ(H, H)* 
   
*: Seldom “High”-“High” Pair, therefore no enough variation 
 
 
2.8. CONCLUSION 
We provide theoretical and empirical analyses of hierarchy effects and peer effects 
in the large network game. We contribute to the literature by incorporating social status 
in peer effects and providing an easy implemented estimation method to recover the 
parameter of interest. 
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CHAPTER III 
SEMIPARAMETRIC PANEL DATA TRUNCATED REGRESSION MODEL WITH 
FIXED EFFECTS, WITH CHUNRONG AI AND HONGJUN LI 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Truncated model is widely used to deal with incomplete observations of the 
dependent variable, which are commonly encountered in empirical economic analysis. 
For example, in labor economics, the wages and other demographic characteristics of 
unemployed people are not observed and therefore those unemployed are truncated from 
the sample. If we are interested in a relationship between the income and the education, 
we have to take into account the missing data issue. Econometricians suggest several 
approaches to solve this missing data problem. Main streams include truncated 
regression models and partial identified models. Truncated regression model is one of 
the Tobit models which deal with data with some part totally missed, both dependent 
variable and independent variables. With latent variables, truncated regression models 
propose consistent estimators for the parameters and give the corresponding asymptotic 
properties (i.e. Powell (1986), Honoré (1992), Honoré and Powell (1992), Lewbel and 
Linton (2002), etc.). Partial identification models relax the point identified estimation 
and allow unknown properties for the truncated sample. Researchers achieve 
bound/interval estimation and allow more general structure of the missing data in recent 
years (i.e. Manski (1995, 2003, 2005), Horowitz and Manski (1995, 2006), Molinari 
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(2008), etc.) In this paper, we focus on the truncated regression model and contribute to 
the literature by allowing more flexible regression form.  
We consider a partially linear panel data truncated regression model with fixed 
effects. Economic theories seldom suggest linear relationships between economic 
variables and there are several applications in which parametric models do not fit the 
real data well (i.e. Härdle (1990), Horowitz and Lee (2002), Perrigne and Vuong (2011), 
etc.). Thus more flexible models (Semiparametric and Nonparametric) are desirable 
when we are not confident in making correct model specification. Nonparametric models 
receive much attention from the researchers in the last three decades (See Li and Racine 
(2007), Pagan and Ullah (1999)). However, nonparametric estimations suffer from three 
main drawbacks: (1) Curse of dimensionality; (2) The results are hard to display, 
communicate and interpret; (3) Fail to allow extrapolation (See Horowitz (2009) for 
details). Unlike nonparametric models, semiparametric models have the convenience of 
parametric structure and the flexibility of nonparametric form and avoid the drawbacks 
of both. Our main contribution in this paper is applying sieve method to the 
nonparametric components of the nonstandard panel data truncated regression model 
with fixed effects while keeping the √n  convergent rate of the parametric estimator.  
The identification and estimation of truncated regression model are quite different 
from the standard linear regression models even in the cross-sectional case. The 
conventional OLS method is not consistent since the distribution from the truncated 
sample is rescaled so that the conditional independence of the regressors and error do not 
hold. For the truncated regression model, the observations are drawn from the population 
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by conditioning on certain event. Specific definition of truncated data will be given 
below. To achieve consistent estimation, Powell (1986) constructs a trimmed least 
squares estimator for cross sectional truncated regression model. With symmetrical 
trimming technique, Powell recovers the symmetry of the distribution of the dependent 
variable and gets conditional moment restriction at the cost of dropping part of the data. 
For panel data, the story is different since there are fixed effects or random effects. Panel 
data models gains much more attention in recent years. While random effects presents in 
some experimental data, researchers usually consider the one dimension effects to be 
fixed. Time invariant fixed effects terms are used to capture the endogeneity. We can use 
differencing method to get rid of the fixed effects terms can without directly estimate 
them. It is well known that the maximum likelihood estimators with direct estimation of 
fixed effects terms are consistent. However, for a truncated regression model with fixed 
effects, due to the nonlinear nature of these models, we cannot get rid of the fixed effects 
by simple differencing. Honoré (1992) extends the idea of symmetrical trimming of 
Powell (1986) to panel data model with fixed effects and proposes a trimming LAD 
estimation method for panel data truncated regression model with fixed effects. He 
establishes consistency and √n  asymptotic normality of his proposed estimator. Our 
model is a direct extension of Honoré’s model by incorporating nonparametric 
component. While similar model, our identification strategy and estimation method are 
different. Our semiparametric model has the advantages to deliver economic 
interpretation from the parametric part and conduct policy analysis by extrapolation 
while keeping the flexibility.  
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For identification, we derive the conditional moment restrictions following similar 
arguments in Honoré (1992). The difference is that our new conditional moment 
restriction involves the nonparametric part due to the partially linear form in the 
regression. For estimation, we apply a sieve estimation method. Sieve method is popular 
due to its √n convergent rate in asymptotic sense and easy implementation. For the 
convergence rates of sieve methods, we refer to Andrews (1991) and Newey (1995, 
1997), Chen (2007). Especially for those models containing nonsmooth objective 
function in parameters and unknown functions. In our model, the objective function is 
nonstandard, nonsmooth in the parametric parameters and nonparametric unknown 
function. With sieve estimation methods we can directly plug in series approximation in 
the objective function and solve the series coefficients easily while not affecting the 
linear parameter and estimated variance. We establish the consistency and √n 
asymptotic normal distribution of the estimator for the linear parameter. The conditions 
we provide in this paper are primitive and easy to check.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an introduction of 
panel data truncated regression models with fixed effects and the idea of symmetrical 
trimming and propose our estimator. Section 3 shows our identification strategy. Section 
4 derives the consistency for the estimator and section 5 establishes the asymptotic 
normality of our estimator. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
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3.2 PANEL DATA TRUNCATED REGRESSION MODEL WITH FIXED 
EFFECTS 
We consider the following semiparametric panel data truncated regression model: Yit∗ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋it′ 𝛽 + ℎ(𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                                                                   (1) 
where Yit∗  is a latent variable, Xit is a d1-dimension vector of explanatory variables, Zit is 
a d2-dimension vector of contextual variables and ϵit is the error terms. β is a vector of 
parameters of primary interest with dimension d1, αi is the fixed effects and h(⋅) is an 
unknown function. We assume β ∈ ℬ, where ℬ is a compact subset of ℝd1, and h ∈ ℋ, 
where ℋ is an infinite dimensional subset of a Banach space with norm ∥⋅∥s, such as the 
space of bounded continuous functions with the sup-norm ∥ h ∥s= supz |ℎ(𝑧)|, or the 
space of square integrable functions with the root mean squared norm ∥ h ∥s=
�𝔼[ℎ2(𝑍)]. We denote θ ≡ (β, h). 
Typical panel data have a large number of individuals and few time periods. So we 
assume the number of time periods is fixed. Without loss of generality, we assume the 
number of time periods is two. We can easily extend our results to the cases of T > 2. 
For the Truncated regression model, the observations {(Yit , Xit, Zit): t = 1, 2; i =1,⋯ , n}  are a random sample from the distribution of {(Yit∗  , Xit, Zit): t = 1, 2; i =1,⋯ , n} induced by conditioning on the event {Yit∗ > 0}. That is, when Yit∗ ≤ 0, we can 
observe neither Yit∗  nor the corresponding Xit  and Zit . We use set of k(n) sieve basis 
functions to approximate h0, i.e. hk(n)(Zi)  ≡  Pk(n)(Zi)′δk(n). Denote the space of the 
series approximation function as ℋk(n). Pk(n)(Zi) could be power series, Fourier series, 
splines, wavelets and many other series or combined ones. To achieve regular 
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asymptotic properties, k(n) is set to satisfy: k(n) → ∞  as n → ∞  and k(n) n → 0  as n → ∞. 
Assumption 1. The conditional distribution of (𝜀𝑖1, 𝜀𝑖2)  given (𝛼,𝑋𝑖1,𝑋𝑖2,𝑍𝑖1,𝑍𝑖2)  is 
continuous with finite density for all i.  
Assumption 2. The distribution of 𝜀𝑖1 − 𝜀𝑖2  conditional on 𝜀𝑖1 + 𝜀𝑖2  and on (𝛼,𝑋𝑖1,𝑋𝑖2,𝑍𝑖1,𝑍𝑖2) is strictly unimodal and symmetric around 0. 
With assumption 1 and 2, and applying the symmetrical trimming approach in 
Honoré (1992) we construct our estimator as 
θ�𝑘(𝑛) = arg max
β∈ℬ,hk(n)∈ℋ𝑘(𝑛) 𝑅𝑛(𝜃𝑘(n)) 
where 
𝑅𝑛�𝜃𝑘(n)� = − 1𝑛���Δ𝑌𝑖 − Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 − Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(Zi)�2𝑛
𝑖=1× 1�𝑌𝑖1 ≥ Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖),𝑌𝑖2 ≥ −𝑋𝑖′𝛽 − Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)� + 𝑌𝑖12× 1�𝑌𝑖1 ≥ Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖),𝑌𝑖2 < −𝑋𝑖′𝛽 − Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)� + 𝑌𝑖22× 1�𝑌𝑖1 < Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖),𝑌𝑖2 ≥ −𝑋𝑖′𝛽 − Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)�� 
where ΔXi ≡ Xi1 − Xi2,Δh(Zi) ≡  h(Zi1) − h(Zi2 . θk(n)  enters Rn�θk(n)�  nonsmoothly 
due to the indicator functions. For notation simplification, we define the following 
function: 
ϕ(ν1, 𝜈2, 𝛾) ≡ � 𝜈12, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛾 ≤ −𝜈2,                        (ν1 − 𝜈2 − 𝛾)2,𝑓𝑜𝑟 − 𝜈2 < 𝛾 < 𝜈1,
𝜈2
2,𝑓𝑜𝑟 ν1 ≤ 𝛾                                     
Hence 
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𝑅𝑛�𝜃𝑘(n)� = − 1𝑛�𝜙(𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑌𝑖1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖))  
For notation simplicity, we consider one unknown function. The generalization to 
multiple unknown functions, however, is straightforward. In the appendix A, we propose 
a two-stage estimation method for the model with multiple unknown functions. The 
asymptotic properties of the multiple functions model are similar to the single unknown 
function model and can be easily achieved through the same technique used to draw the 
results of single unknown function model. 
 
3.3 IDENTIFICATION 
Hereafter, we focus on Rn(θ) to derive identification, consistency and asymptotic 
normality. We here abuse notation to have ∥ θ ∥s=∥ 𝛽 ∥ +∥ ℎ ∥𝑠 , where ∥⋅∥  is the 
Euclidean norm. We will get specific definition for khks below. Recall 
𝑅𝑛�𝜃𝑘(n)� = − 1𝑛�𝜙(𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑌𝑖1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)) 
Let 
ϕ0(ν1, ν2, 𝛾, 𝛾0) = 1{𝜈1 > 0 , 𝜈2 > 0}[𝜙(𝜈1, 𝜈2, 𝛾) −𝜙(ν1, 𝜈2, 𝛾0)] 
and 
𝑅𝑛
0�𝜃𝑘(n)� ≡ 𝑅𝑛�𝜃𝑘(𝑛)� − Rn(𝜃0)
= − 1
𝑛
�𝜙0(𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑌𝑖1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖),Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖))  
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Assumption 3. (i)The parameter space ℬ  is compact, and the true value of the 
parameter is an interior point of 𝛩, 𝜃0 ∈ 𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝛩; (ii) h0(0) = 0, hk(n)(0) = 0 for any hk(n)  ∈ ℋk(n) and h(0)  =  0 for any h ∈ ℋ. 
Remark 1. Our assumption 3 is general. For power series and spline, we can achieve 
the 0 value by supressing the intercept term. We can also impose other normalization 
condition instead, i.e.,∫ ℎ0(𝑧)dz = 0𝒵 , ∫ ℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑧)dz = 0𝒵  and ∫ ℎ(𝑧)dz = 0𝒵 . 
Assumption 4. There is no proper linear subspace of ℝd+k(n) containing the random 
variable 1{P(Yi1 > 0, Yi2 > 0|Xi1, Xi2, Zi1, Zi2)}(ΔXi′,Δ𝑃𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)′)′ with probability 1. 
Lemma 1. If the density of ν1 − 𝜈2 − 𝛾0 conditional on ν1 + 𝜈2 is strictly unimodal and 
symmetric around 0, then with assumption 4, 𝔼(φ0(ν1, ν2, γ, γ0)  achieves its unique 
minimum at γ = γ0.  
Proof. The proof is the same as that in Lemma A.2 of Honoré (1992). 
Proposition 1. If the density of Yi1 − Yi2 − ΔXi′β0 − Δh0(Zi) conditional on Yi1 + Yi2 is 
strictly unimodal and symmetric around Xi′β0 + Δh0(Zi) = 0, with assumption 3 and 4, 
𝔼�Rn0  �θk(n)�� is uniquely minimized at θk(n) = θ0. 
Proof. From the lemma 1, we have that 𝔼 �ϕ0 �Yi1, Yi2,ΔXi′β + Δhk(n)(Zi),ΔXi′β0 +
Δh0(Zi)�� is uniquely minimized at a θ = �β, hk(n)� such that 
ΔXi′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖) = Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖)                                                                                  (2) 
Let  
hj∗ = arg minhk(n)∈ℋ𝑘(𝑛) 𝔼 ��Δ𝑋𝑖[𝑗] − Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(⋅)�2� 
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where Xi[j] is the j-th element of vector Xi. Denote h∗ = (h1∗ ,⋯ , hd∗ )′. 
Therefore we have (ΔXi − Δℎ∗)′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖) + Δℎ∗′𝛽 = (Δ𝑋𝑖 − Δℎ∗)′𝛽0 + Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖) + Δℎ∗′𝛽0 
Left multiplying (ΔXi − Δh∗) and taking expectation, and with the construction of h∗, 
we have 
𝔼[(ΔXi − Δℎ∗)(ΔXi − Δℎ∗)′]𝛽 = 𝔼[(ΔXi − Δℎ∗)(ΔXi − Δℎ∗)′]𝛽0 
With full rank of 𝔼[(ΔXi − Δℎ∗)(ΔXi − Δℎ∗)′], we have that β = β0 . Therefore 
from equation (1), we have 
Δhk(n)(⋅) = Δℎ0(⋅) 
With assumption 3 and imposingZi1 = 0, we have hk(n)(0) − ℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖2) = ℎ0(0) − ℎ0(Zi2) 
Since Zi2  exhausts the support of z , we have that hk(n) = h0 . Thus 𝔼�Rn0  �θk(n)��  is 
uniquely minimized at θk(n) = θ0. 
 
3.4 CONSISTENCY 
Assumption 5. 𝔼[∥ 𝑋𝑡 ∥2] , 𝔼[𝛼 ∥ 𝛥𝑋 ∥] , 𝔼�∥ 𝑃𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑡) ∥2�  , 𝔼�𝛼 ∥ 𝛥𝑃𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑡) ∥� , 
𝔼�𝜖𝑗 ∥ 𝛥𝑋 ∥� and 𝔼�𝜖𝑗 ∥ 𝛥𝑃𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑡) ∥�are finite with𝑗 = 1, 2 and 𝑡 = 1, 2. 
Assumption 6. There is a constant µ > 0 such that for any θ ∈ Θ, there is πk(n)θ ∈
Θk(n)  satisfying ∥ πk(n)θ − θ ∥s= O(k(n)−µ)  where k(n)−𝜇 = 𝑜 �𝑛14� . Without loss of 
generality, we take µ = 1. 
Remark 2. We can take 𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃 as 𝜃𝑘(𝑛) while 𝜋𝜃 is a general notation. 
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Remark 3. Assumption 6 is about the approximation error of sieve method. With 
general series, this assumption holds. 
Assumption 7. 
ln �𝑁 �𝜀1𝐾 ,ℋ𝑘(𝑛), ∥⋅∥𝑠�� ≤ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡.× 𝑘(𝑛) × ln 𝑘(𝑛)𝜀  
Remark 4. Assumption 7 is the general assumption for the entropy of sieve space, 
i.e.,with h(⋅) from Donsker class, this assumption holds. 
Assumption 8. The conditional density function of Xi and Zi given Yi is continuous. 
Theorem 1. With assumptions 1-8, the minimizer of Rn�θk(n)� over Θk(n), θ�𝑘(𝑛) , is a 
consistent estimator for θ0. 
Proof. We check the three conditions of Shen and Wong (1994) and apply the Theorem 
1 therein to establish consistency. We have 
𝔼 �ϕ�Yi1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)� − ϕ�Yi1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖)��Yi�= 𝑌𝑖12�Pr�𝛥𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + 𝛥ℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖) < −𝑌𝑖2�𝑌𝑖�
− Pr(𝛥𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + 𝛥ℎ0(𝑍𝑖) < −𝑌𝑖2|𝑌𝑖)�+ 𝑌𝑖22�Pr�𝛥𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + 𝛥ℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖) ≥ 𝑌𝑖1�𝑌𝑖�
− Pr(𝛥𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + 𝛥ℎ0(𝑍𝑖) ≥ 𝑌𝑖1|𝑌𝑖)� + �Yi1 − 𝑌𝑖2 − 𝛥𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + 𝛥ℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)�× Pr�−Yi2 < 𝛥𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + 𝛥ℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖) < 𝑌𝑖1�𝑌𝑖�
− [Yi1 − 𝑌𝑖2 − 𝛥𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + 𝛥ℎ0(𝑍𝑖)]× Pr(−Yi2 < 𝛥𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + 𝛥ℎ0(𝑍𝑖) < 𝑌𝑖1|𝑌𝑖) 
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Since cumulative density function is continuous in θ , we have that �F�θk(n); ·� −F(θ0; ·)�  ≤  A1 ∥ θk(n) − θ0 ∥s.  Furthermore we have that G�θk(n); ·� ≡ �Yi1 − Yi2 −
ΔXi′β − Δhk(n)(Zi)�2  is continuous in θk(n)  and therefore we have similar result that 
�G�θk(n); ·� − G(θ0; ·)� ≤ A2 ∥ θk(n) − θ0 ∥s . Constants A1, A2 > 0  and ∥ θk(n) −
θ0 ∥s≡∥ β − β0 ∥ +∥ hk(n) − h0 ∥s . After adding and subtracting �Yi1 − 𝑌𝑖2 − 𝛥𝑋𝑖′𝛽 +
𝛥ℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)� × Pr(−Yi2 < 𝛥𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + 𝛥ℎ0(𝑍𝑖) < 𝑌𝑖1|𝑌𝑖)  in above equation, and with 
finiteness of Yit , we have 
𝔼 �ϕ�Yi1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)� − ϕ�Yi1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖)��Yi�
≤ {𝐴1(𝑌𝑖12 + 𝑌𝑖22) + 𝐴2[Yi1 − 𝑌𝑖2 − 𝛥𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + 𝛥ℎ0(𝑍𝑖)]2 + 1} ×
∥ 𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0 ∥s 
With finite support of Yi, we have that 
𝔼 �ϕ �Yi1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)� − ϕ�Yi1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖)��Yi� ≤ 𝐴 ×
∥ 𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0 ∥s ,            𝐴 < ∞ 
Therefore, Condition C1 in Shen and Wong (1994) holds with α = 1
2
. 
Similarly, we can easily show that  Var �ϕ �Yi1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)� − ϕ�Yi1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖)��Yi� ≤ 𝐵 ×
∥ 𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0 ∥s ,            𝐵 < ∞ 
Thus Condition C2 in Shen and Wong (1994) holds with β = 1(here β and above α 
are following the definition of those in Shen and Wong (1994)). Condition C3 holds with 
assumption 7. Thus we have 
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∥ θ�𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠= 𝑂𝑝�max�𝑛−𝜏, ∥ 𝜋k(n)𝜃0 − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠, K�πk(n)𝜃0,𝜃0��� = 𝑜𝑝(1)  
where K�πk(n)𝜃0, 𝜃0� ≡ 𝔼�𝜙(⋅,𝜃0) − 𝜙�⋅,𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃0��  and and τ = 12 − ln ln(𝑛)ln(𝑛)  
[Assumption 7 indicates r0 = 14 and r = 0+ in Shen and Wong (1994)]. 
Remark 5. With series selection, we can make K�πk(n)𝜃0,𝜃0�  small enough.  ∥
𝜋k(n)𝜃0 − 𝜃0 ∥s is the approximation error and is small enough. In general, if the rate of K�πk(n)𝜃0,𝜃0� and ∥ 𝜋k(n)𝜃0 − 𝜃0 ∥s are functions of some known nuisance parameters, 
we can draw the best rate of ∥ θ�𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠. 
 
3.5 ASYMPTOTIC NORMALITY 
Define 
ϕθ0
′ (⋅)�𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0�
≡ �
0, Δ𝐷0 ≤ −𝑌𝑖2,
−2�ΔYi − Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 − Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖)��Δ𝑋𝑖′(𝛽 − 𝛽0) + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛) − Δℎ0�,−𝑌𝑖2 < Δ𝐷0 < 𝑌𝑖1,0, ΔD0 ≥ Yi1.  
where ΔD0 = Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖), and r(⋅)�θk(n) − 𝜃0�
≡ ϕ�Yi1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖)� − ϕ�Yi1,𝑌𝑖2,Δ𝑋𝑖′𝛽0 + Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖)�
− 𝜙𝜃0
′ (⋅)�𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0� 
Now we proceed to check the conditions in Shen (1997) to establish the asymptotic 
normality of θ�𝑘(𝑛). We verify them one by one below. 
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Condition A： 
sup
θk(n)∈Θ𝑘(𝑛):∥𝜃𝑘(𝑛)−𝜃0∥𝑠≤𝛿𝑛 1√𝑛 𝜐�𝑟(⋅)�𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0� − 𝑟(⋅)�𝜋k(n)𝜃∗ − 𝜃0�� = 𝑂𝑝(𝜍𝑛2) 
where θ∗ = (1 − 𝜍𝑛)𝜃 + 𝜍𝑛(𝜃0 + 𝑢∗) , ςn = 𝑜 �𝑛−12� , u∗ = ±𝜈∗  and ν∗  is the Riesz 
representer which will be defined below. υ(g) ≡ 1
√n
∑ [𝑔(⋅) − 𝔼0g(⋅)]𝑛𝑖=1 . Because r(·)[·] 
is nonzero only in the middle support, we here focus on these nonzero values r(·)[·]. r(⋅)�θk(n) − θ0� − 𝑟(⋅)�𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃∗ − 𝜃0�= 𝑟(⋅)�𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0� − 𝑟(⋅)[𝜃∗ − 𝜃0] + 𝑟(⋅)[𝜃∗ − 𝜃0]
− 𝑟(⋅)�𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃∗ − 𝜃0� 
and  
𝑟(⋅)�𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0� − 𝑟(⋅)[𝜃∗ − 𝜃0]= �ΔXi′(𝛽 − 𝛽0) + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖) − Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖)�2
− [ΔXi′(𝛽∗ − 𝛽0) + Δℎ∗(𝑍𝑖) − Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖)]2= �ΔXi′(𝛽 − 𝛽0) + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖) − Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖) + ΔXi′(𝛽∗ − 𝛽0) + Δℎ∗(𝑍𝑖)
− Δℎ0(𝑍𝑖)� × �Δ𝑖′(𝛽 − 𝛽∗) + Δℎ𝑘(𝑛)(𝑍𝑖) − Δℎ∗(𝑍𝑖)�
≈ 𝑂𝑝�∥ 𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠� × 𝑂𝑝 ∥ 𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃∗ ∥𝑠= 𝑂𝑝�𝜍𝑛 ×∥ 𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠� 
Similarly, when ∥ θk(n) − θ0 ∥𝑠≤ 𝛿𝑛, we have  
𝑟(⋅)[𝜃∗ − 𝜃0] − 𝑟(⋅)�𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃∗ − 𝜃0� = 𝑂𝑝(𝜍n2). 
Thus when we take δn = 𝑂(𝜍𝑛) 
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sup
θk(n)∈Θ𝑘(𝑛):∥𝜃𝑘(𝑛)−𝜃0∥𝑠≤𝛿𝑛 1√𝑛 𝜐�𝑟(⋅)�𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0� − 𝑟(⋅)�𝜋k(n)𝜃∗ − 𝜃0��
= 1
𝑛
��𝑟(⋅)�𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0� − 𝑟(⋅)�𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃∗ − 𝜃0�� = 1𝑛 × 𝑛 × 𝑂𝑝(𝜍𝑛2)𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝑂𝑝(𝜍𝑛2) 
Therefore Condition A in Shen (1997) holds in our case. 
Condition B: sup
θk(n)∈Θ𝑘(𝑛):0<∥𝜃𝑘(𝑛)−𝜃0∥𝑠≤𝛿𝑛�𝐾�𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃∗,𝜃0� − 𝐾�𝜃𝑘(𝑛), 𝜃0��
−
12 �∥ 𝜃∗ − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠2 −∥ 𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠2� = 𝑂(𝜍𝑛2) 
Since function K(·,·) is an expectation, it is second differentiable in θ. Define 
∥ θk(n) − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠≡ ��𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0�′ 𝑑2𝐾�𝜃𝑘(𝑛),𝜃0�𝑑𝜃𝑑𝜃′ �𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0��12   
Thus  
K(θ∗,𝜃0) = K(θ0,𝜃0) + 𝑑𝐾(𝜃0,𝜃0)𝑑𝜃 (𝜃∗ − 𝜃0) + 12 (𝜃∗ − 𝜃0)′ 𝑑2𝐾(𝜃∗,𝜃0)𝑑𝜃𝑑𝜃′ (𝜃∗ − 𝜃0)+ small term 
We have K(θ0,θ0) = 0 and dK(θ0,θ0)dθ  =  0. Hence we have 
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K�πk(n)𝜃∗,𝜃0� = 12 ∥ 𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃∗ − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠2+ 𝑜𝑝�∥ 𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃∗ − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠�= 12 �∥ 𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃∗ − 𝜃∗ ∥𝑠2+ 2 ∥ 𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃∗ − 𝜃∗ ∥𝑠∥ 𝜃∗ − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠 +
∥ 𝜃∗ − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠
2� + 𝑜𝑝�∥ 𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃∗ − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠�
= 𝑂(𝛿𝑛−2𝜍𝑛4) + 𝑂(𝛿𝑛−1𝜍𝑛2) × 𝛿𝑛 + 12 ∥ 𝜃∗ − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠2+ 𝑜(𝜍𝑛2) = 12 ×
∥ 𝜃∗ − 𝜃0 ∥𝑠
2+ 𝑂(𝜍𝑛2) 
Thus we have Condition B satisfied. 
Condition C: sup
θk(n)∈Θ𝑘(𝑛):0<∥𝜃𝑘(𝑛)−𝜃0∥𝑠≤𝛿𝑛 ∥ 𝜃∗ − 𝜋𝑘(𝑛)𝜃∗ ∥𝑠 = 𝑂(𝛿n−1𝜍𝑛2) 
Condition C holds with conventional sieve estimators, i.e. Power series, Fourier Series, 
Spline series, etc. 
With Assumption 7 and the Lemma 4 in Shen and Wong (1994), we have that Condition 
D in Shen (1997) holds in our case. Define f(θ) ≡ β, we have 
Theorem 2  
√𝑛(?̂?𝑛 − 𝛽0) 𝑑→ 𝑁(0,𝑉) 
where 𝑉 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟0�𝜙𝜃0′ (⋅)[𝜈∗]� and 𝜈∗  satisfying < 𝜈∗,𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0 > = 𝑓𝜃0′ �𝜃𝑘(𝑛) − 𝜃0� =
𝛽 − 𝛽0.  
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we generalize the linear panel data truncated model with fixed effect 
to allow for a nonparametric component. With primitive assumptions, we identify the 
 52 
 
parametric parameter and the nonparametric unknown function. We propose a sieve 
estimation method for our nonstandard truncated regression model and establish the 
consistencies of both parametric parameter and nonparametric unknown function. 
Furthermore, we achieve √n convergent rate for the parametric parameter. Economic 
theories seldom suggest parametric relationships between economic variables. Therefore, 
semiparametric models are more desirable when we have less evidence on specific 
parametric relationship. With our approach, we can avoid misspecification problem and 
still have the power to give explanation for economic questions with the parametric 
component estimation. While we establish the √n  asymptotic normality for the 
parametric parameter, the asymptotic normality of the nonparametric component lacks in 
this paper. For this part, we refer to Horowitz and Lee (2005) for further extension. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A SEMIPARAMETRIC APPROACH TO ESTIMATE THE DYNAMIC 
EFFECTIVENESS OF MARKETING MIX IN MARKET RESPONSE MODELS 
IN PIONEER-FOLLOWER CONTEXT, WITH VENKATESH SHANKAR 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Market response models describe how outputs, sales or market shares, respond to 
the marketing activities and how competitors interact. The responsiveness of marketing 
mix variables change over the product life cycle [Parsons (1975)] and also depend on 
contextual variables. Therefore the corresponding marketing strategy and tactics should 
vary over different stages and contexts [Parsons (1975), Gatignon and Hanssens (1987), 
Parker (1992)]. With appropriately estimated market response models, firms could 
optimally allocate the resource among different marketing mix instruments. The 
illustration of marketing mix interactions serve as a basis for marketing strategies for 
marketing mix resource allocation [Gatignon and Hanssens (1987)]. How to model the 
interaction mechanism is crucial to investigate the relationship between market 
performance and marketing efforts [Gatignon and Hanssens (1987)]. The interaction 
mechanism serves like a black box hence the structure assumptions become important 
for market response models. Multiplicative model is widely used in market response 
analyses due to its convenience to position marketing mix variables and contextual 
variables separately. Though multiplicative model provides systematic knowledge about 
the determinants of marketing responsiveness, it suffers from several drawbacks. First, it 
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usually has a linear marketing parameter function which may cause misspecification 
problem. Second, there are usually collinearity problems in the data in the multiplicative 
form. In this paper, we provide a flexible semiparametric model which avoids the 
misspecification and near multicollinearity problems.  
Though managers like a response rule for every period and environment, the 
responsiveness of output, i.e. sales or market shares, with respect to inputs, i.e., 
advertising, promotion, detailing, etc., usually are varying and depend on the context in 
which the response happens. There are two type variables: input variables, i.e. marketing 
mix, and stimuli variables, i.e. contextual variables [Bowman and Gatignon (2009)]. 
How to model these two type variables appropriately is the key to the market response 
model. The basic model frequently used in the literature is the multiplicative model. 
Multiplicative model provides an intuitive way to deal with the two type variables by 
putting the contextual variables in the coefficients. We deploy terminologies marketing 
response function and marketing parameter function in our analyses which is similar as 
those used in Gatignon and Hanssens (1987). The marketing parameter function 
describes the way in which marketing responsiveness is generated. Therefore, the 
contextual variables enter in the marketing parameter function. The market response 
function illustrates how market performance is achieved and hence the marketing mix 
variables are major components. Extant literature either takes the marketing parameter 
function as constant or as linear combination of contextual variables [Parsons (1975), 
Gatignon and Hanssens (1989), Bowman and Gatignon (1996), etc.] An exception is 
Parker (1992) who allows quadratic time term in the coefficients. Though multiplicative 
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model has good performance in market response estimations, it suffers from the 
misspecification and near multicollinearity problems. We introduce a flexible 
semiparametric model to avoid misspecification and near multicollinearity problems. We 
allow the market parameter functions to be unknown functions of contextual variables 
and use nonparametric kernel approach to estimate these unknown functions. The 
specific definitions of response function and parameter function will be described in 
details in section 4.  
In pharmaceutical industry, the competition is not price-based, therefore we 
investigate the responsiveness of advertising and detailing, as described in Gatignon, 
Weitz and Bansal (1990). Competitive environment, i.e. industry concentration, firm size 
and market familiarity all affect the responsiveness of marketing mix variables and the 
entry strategy. The responsiveness of marketing mix variables are affected by firm’s 
capabilities and market conditions [Gatignon, Weitz and Bansal (1990)]. The former 
leads to specific product quality level and the latter impacts on the relative marketing 
effort, the ratio of marketing expenditure. Therefore firm capabilities, market context, 
and relative product quality have a moderating effect on the relationship between 
relative marketing effort and the performance of a brand. In section 3, we discuss the 
determinants of responsiveness in details while due to data restriction; we will only use 
the order of entry and the time in the market as moderators. The number of competitors 
has high correlation with competitive marketing expenditure and hence we drop it.  
The competitive reaction to the marketing mix may offset the effectiveness of these 
variables and therefore change the responsiveness shape of marketing mix instruments. 
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The order of entry does not only contribute to market share/sales through main effect, 
but also indirectly serve as moderator of marketing mix responsiveness [Bowman and 
Gatignon (1996)]. Whether the followers can catch up the pioneer through marketing 
effort is important. How does the order of entry affect the responsiveness of marketing 
mix instruments leads to different marketing strategy to allocate the resource? Is there 
asymmetry among responsiveness for the pioneer and the followers? Due to the near 
multicollinearity problem, the main effect of the order of entry dominates in the 
parametric model. Furthermore, in the more flexible semiparametric model, the main 
effect of order of entry is still significant, not minimal as documented in Bowman and 
Gatignon (1996). To overcome the disadvantage of entering later, the followers have to 
spend substantially more money.  
In our semiparametric estimation, the late entrants have higher responsiveness for 
advertising than detailing, which suggests the late entrants allocate more resource in 
advertising in the early stage to avoid order-of-entry effect, though the responsiveness of 
detailing is usually higher than the corresponding responsiveness of advertising. While 
in the late stage, the high responsiveness of advertising for the late entrant diminishes 
and the late entrants are better to spend more money in detailing. The responsiveness of 
competitive expenditure is not statistically significant. Table 9 provides literature review 
and comparison of market responsive model and related topics. 
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Table 9 Literature on Market Response Models 
Paper Marketing Mix Variables 
Contextual 
Variables 
Model 
Parsons (1975) Advertising 
 
Time 
 
Multiplicative model 
with exponential 
marketing  parameter 
function 
Gatignon and 
Hanssens (1987) 
Advertising; 
Number of Recruiters 
Average Propensity; 
Local Advertising 
Support 
Multiplicative Model 
with linear marketing 
parameter function 
Parker (1992) Price Time 
Diffusion Model with 
quadratic elasticity 
function 
Bowman and 
Gatignon (1996) 
Price; Promotion; 
Advertising; 
Product Quality; 
Competitive Advertising 
Order of Entry; 
Number of 
Competitors 
Multiplicative Model 
with linear marketing 
parameter function 
Shankar and Bayus 
(2003) 
Price; 
Advertising 
Network Size; 
Product Quality; 
Multiplicative Model 
with linear marketing 
parameter function 
Valratsas, Feinberg, 
Bass and 
Kalyanram (2004) 
Advertising; Distribution; 
Price; Order of Entry; 
Time in Market 
Regime Threshold 
Multiplicative Model 
with Regime Switch 
Van Heerde, Mela, 
And Manchanda 
(2004) 
Price; 
Promotion; 
Innovation Brand: 
Pioneer Dummy and 
Early Follower 
Dummy 
Multiplicative Model 
with linear auto- 
regressive marketing 
parameter function  
Narayanan, 
Manchanda, and 
Chintagunta (2005) 
Marketing 
Communication/Detailing 
Time 
Structural Model of 
Demand and Random 
Coefficient Models 
with a Bayesian 
learning process 
Danaher, Bonfrer, 
and Dhar (2008) 
Price ; 
Advertising; 
Promotion 
Competitive Clutter 
Multiplicative model 
with exponential 
marketing  parameter 
function 
Osinga, Leeflang, 
and Wieringa 
(2010) 
Detailing; 
Competitive Marketing 
Expenditure 
Detailing; 
Competitive 
Marketing 
Expenditure  
Structural 
Multiplicative Model 
Lin and Shankar 
(2013) 
Advertising; 
Detailing; 
Competitive Marketing 
Expenditure 
Order of Entry; 
Time in Market 
Smooth Coefficient 
Multiplicative Model 
 
Table 10 gives a brief comparison of parametric and semiparametric methods in 
several dimensions. Our out-of-sample results confirm the well-established advantages 
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and drawbacks of semiparametric methods. With rich data, the semiparametric methods 
usually outperform the parametric methods while the performance reverses with small 
sample size [Horowitz (2009), Li and Racine (2007)]. 
 
Table 10 Comparison of Parametric and Semiparametric Models 
Comparison of Parametric and Semiparametric Models 
Dimension Parametric Model Semiparametric Model 
Small Sample Size Better Worse 
Rich Data Worse Better 
Dynamic Responsiveness Fail 
Good Managerial 
Implications 
Model Fitting Worse Better 
 
 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we briefly discuss the data used in the 
analysis. Section 3 investigates the determinants of responsiveness. The models are 
developed in section 4 and the corresponding estimation methods are proposed. Section 
5 illustrates the results from different model specifications and we draw the main 
conclusions. The managerial implications from conventional parametric model and the 
smooth varying coefficient model are discussed in section 6. Section 7 provides several 
limitations of our model and future research directions. The semiparametric smooth 
varying coefficient model is introduced in the appendix C. 
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4.2. DATA 
Data from two pharmaceutical categories, Fluoxetine and Statin, are used in our 
analyses. The data for Fluoxetine is from Jan 1988 to Dec 1995 and the time range for 
Statin is from Oct 1987 to Jan 1996. In both categories, we choose the first four brands, 
one pioneer and three early followers. We will use all four firms for our market response 
analyses of different approaches while in the out of sample prediction analyses, we will 
use part of the data due to time windows selection. We have monthly advertising, 
detailing and total prescriptions for all top four brands. The descriptive statistics of the 
variables appear in Table 11. Firms invest more in detailing than in advertising.  
 
 
Table 11 Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
Fluoxetine Statin 
Firm Var. Mean (Std) Firm Var. Mean (Std) 
 AD 98.15(85.75)  AD 202.40(231.68) 
PROZAC DT 2062.43(618.12) MEVACOR DT 1573.74(453.18) 
 TP 888.48(364.52)  TP 659.46(269.73) 
 AD 541.39(394.93)  AD 481.31(864.62) 
ZOLOFT DT 2719.89(754.91) PRAVACHOL DT 1878.88(732.87) 
 TP 678.50(314.37)  TP 313.27(134.06) 
 AD 469.8(502.27)  AD 287.66(434.53) 
PAXIL DT 2906.51(1250.92) ZOCOR DT 1822.02(366.47) 
 TP 469.06(206.00)  TP 304.13(194.93) 
 AD 258.22(116.71)  AD 761.00(522.96) 
LUVOX DT 1533.11(309.81) LESCOL DT 2085.70(908.53) 
 TP 41.56(9.95)  TP 227.95(107.19) 
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In our analysis, we pool the four firms’ data and take advertising, detailing, 
competitive expenditure as the marketing mix. Because the number of competitors is 
highly correlated with logarithm competitive marketing expenditure, we drop it from the 
contextual variables. Therefore we have the order of entry and the time in the market as 
moderators. In this paper, we use “contextual variables” and “moderator” 
interchangeably. Table 2 provides literature review on market response model. In those 
papers, both marketing mix variables and contextual variables differ. 
 
 
4.3. DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSIVENESS 
4.3.1. Order of Entry 
How does the order of entry enter the response model? Literature suggests two 
main functions: main effect or moderator. Bowman and Gatignon (1996) investigate the 
role of the order of entry. They suggest that the order of entry is more like a moderator. 
The benefits of early entry are that the pioneer can choose the most profitable segment of 
the market and also the pioneer could claim monopolistic profits. The costs of early 
entry include facing uncertainty and the resistance from consumers to adopt new product, 
i.e., Oracle named its first product ORACLE 2.0, actually the first edition, is one attempt 
to reduce the resistance of buyers to purchase the first edition (Larry Ellison). 
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4.3.2. Number of Competitors 
Number of competitors captures the competitive contextual effect. Because 
competitors usually initiate corresponding marketing strategies and this reduces the 
effectiveness of marketing mix expenditure [Steenkamp, Nijs, Hanssens and Dekimpe 
(2005)]. The competitive reactions from competitors offset the efforts made and the 
magnitude of competitive reactions is highly correlated with the number of competitors. 
Therefore the number of competitors has contextual effect on the market output. 
 
4.3.3. Time in the Market 
The diffusion literature suggests in different stages of the product, the effectiveness 
of the marketing mix instruments varies. Generally, in the early stage of new product, 
the exposure is important to attract early adopters and therefore advertising and detailing 
play key roles at the early stage of the new product. During the matured stage, usually 
promotion takes the role from advertising and detailing since the follower-type 
consumers are more price sensitive. Therefore the time of a product in the market is 
important for the analysis of responsiveness and the time in the market serves as one 
contextual variable in market response model. Bass diffusion model and its extensions 
provide details for the effect of stages on market performance. 
 
4.3.4. Network Size 
Customer network is argued to be an asset of firms and the network size affects the 
responsiveness of marketing mix expenditure [Shankar and Bayus (2003)]. In the 
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technological categories, the compatibility is very important. Products of Apple always 
suffer from the incompatibility issue though they have large sales and market shares. 
The abundance of app store somewhat affects the competitions among main smart phone 
manufacturers and the effectiveness of marketing mix instruments. 
 
4.3.5. Innovation 
The innovation plays a similar role as network size. There are several platform 
competitions behind the terminal product competitions. For instance, there are three 
main smart phone operation systems, iOS, Android and Windows’. Competitions among 
smart phones usually are impacted by which platforms they deployed. Therefore the 
market responsiveness is affected by innovation [van Heerde, Mela and Manchanda 
(2004)]. 
 
 
4.4. MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND ESTIMATION 
4.4.1. Parametric Multiplicative Model Specification 
We first put our analysis in the well-received multiplicative model and illustrate 
two main drawbacks it suffers. ln𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡,𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡) + ln𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 𝛽1(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡,𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡)+ ln𝐷𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 𝛽2(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡,𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡) + ln𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 𝛽3(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡,𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡)+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                      (1) 
where  
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α(OEit,𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡,𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 
β1(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡, TMit) = β10 + β11𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 
β2(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡, TMit) = β20 + β21𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 
β3(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡, TMit) = β30 + β31𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽32𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽33𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 
 
The first drawback of parametric multiplicative model is the near multicollinearity 
problem. The following table documents the correlation among the marketing mix 
variables, the contextual variables, and their interaction terms. We denote that two 
variables are highly correlated if their correlation is larger than 75%. Those highly 
correlated pairs are marked yellow in Table 12 and Table 13. From Table 12, we know 
that only ln𝐴𝐷 , ln𝐷𝑇 , ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 , TM  and OE  are free from near multicollinearity.         
Therefore we only keep these variables and model (1) reduces to 
  ln𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + β10ln𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽20 ln𝐷𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽30 ln𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                      (2) 
 
In model (2), the contextual variables, OE and TM enter the market response model as 
main effects. Therefore, the late entrants can spend money in AD and DT to overcome 
the disadvantage of not entering as the pioneer while take advantage of the benefits of 
entering later, less uncertainty and less consumer resistance towards adopting a new 
innovation. However, the contextual variables usually not only have the main effect, 
they also serve as moderators on the responsiveness of marketing mix variables. 
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Therefore, due to near multicollinearity issue, the linear multiplicative may not be 
suitable for capturing such moderator role of contextual variables. For the STATIN 
category, the bear multicollinearity problem is slightly weaker than that of 
FLUOXETINE category, see Table 13. Though the near multicollinearity problem is 
relative weak, we can also exclude a lot of regressors from model (1) and have  
  ln𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + β10ln𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽20 ln𝐷𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽30 ln𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1+ 𝛽4 ln𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 × ln𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                                   (2′) 
 
We only have six regressors in the regression. 
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Table 12 Correlation Matrix for Model (1): Fluoxetine 
Correlation Matrix of Marketing Mix Variables, Contextual Variables and their interaction terms for FLUOXETINE 
 ln𝐴𝐷 ln𝐷𝑇 ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 TM OE NC ln𝐴𝐷 × ln𝐷𝑇 ln𝐴𝐷 × ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 ln𝐷𝑇 × ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 ln𝐴𝐷 × TM ln𝐴𝐷 × OE ln𝐴𝐷 × NC ln𝐷𝑇 × TM ln𝐷𝑇 × OE ln𝐷𝑇 × NC ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × TM ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × OE ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × NC ln𝐴𝐷 1.00 
                 ln𝐷𝑇 0.49 1.00 
                ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 0.30 0.50 1.00 
               TM -0.35 0.22 0.23 1.00 
              OE 0.46 0.17 0.51 -0.55 1.00 
             NC 0.30 0.40 0.89 0.26 0.58 1.00 
            ln𝐴𝐷 × ln𝐷𝑇 0.99 0.58 0.37 -0.31 0.46 0.34 1.00 
           ln𝐴𝐷 × ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 0.66 0.55 0.89 -0.02 0.62 0.81 0.71 1.00 
          ln𝐷𝑇 × ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 0.33 0.54 1.00 0.23 0.50 0.88 0.40 0.91 1.00 
         ln𝐴𝐷 × TM -0.06 0.28 0.29 0.91 -0.44 0.36 -0.03 0.16 0.29 1.00 
        ln𝐴𝐷 × OE 0.73 0.32 0.50 -0.54 0.93 0.54 0.73 0.73 0.50 -0.37 1.00 
       ln𝐴𝐷 × NC 0.57 0.44 0.82 0.06 0.66 0.93 0.60 0.90 0.82 0.26 0.72 1.00 
      ln𝐷𝑇 × TM -0.33 0.24 0.25 1.00 -0.54 0.27 -0.29 0.01 0.25 0.91 -0.53 0.08 1.00 
     ln𝐷𝑇 × OE 0.51 0.27 0.54 -0.53 0.99 0.60 0.53 0.66 0.54 -0.41 0.95 0.69 -0.51 1.00 
    ln𝐷𝑇 × NC 0.32 0.43 0.89 0.26 0.57 1.00 0.37 0.83 0.89 0.37 0.54 0.94 0.28 0.59 1.00 
   ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × TM -0.20 0.29 0.58 0.89 -0.29 0.56 -0.15 0.33 0.58 0.84 -0.29 0.36 0.90 -0.26 0.57 1.00 
  ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × OE 0.46 0.31 0.75 -0.33 0.95 0.77 0.48 0.79 0.74 -0.23 0.89 0.81 -0.32 0.96 0.76 -0.01 1.00  ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × NC 0.29 0.39 0.88 0.26 0.58 1.00 0.33 0.80 0.87 0.36 0.54 0.93 0.27 0.59 1.00 0.56 0.76 1.00 
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Table 13 Correlation Matrix of Model (1): Statin 
Correlation Matrix of Marketing Mix Variables, Contextual Variables and their interaction terms for STATIN 
 ln𝐴𝐷 ln𝐷𝑇 ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 TM OE NC ln𝐴𝐷 × ln𝐷𝑇 ln𝐴𝐷 × ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 ln𝐷𝑇 × ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 ln𝐴𝐷 × TM ln𝐴𝐷 × OE ln𝐴𝐷 × NC ln𝐷𝑇 × TM ln𝐷𝑇 × OE ln𝐷𝑇 × NC ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × TM ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × OE ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × NC ln𝐴𝐷 1.00 
                 ln𝐷𝑇 -0.06 1.00 
                ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 -0.09 0.29 1.00 
               TM -0.36 -0.12 0.21 1.00 
              OE 0.08 0.25 0.50 -0.52 1.00 
             NC -0.15 0.22 0.92 0.27 0.55 1.00 
            ln𝐴𝐷 × ln𝐷𝑇 1.00 0.02 -0.07 -0.38 0.11 -0.13 1.00 
           ln𝐴𝐷 × ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 0.74 0.13 0.57 -0.19 0.40 0.47 0.76 1.00 
          ln𝐷𝑇 × ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 -0.10 0.38 1.00 0.19 0.51 0.91 -0.06 0.56 1.00 
         ln𝐴𝐷 × TM 0.51 -0.35 0.00 0.46 -0.35 0.01 0.47 0.39 -0.04 1.00 
        ln𝐴𝐷 × OE 0.74 0.17 0.26 -0.51 0.64 0.27 0.75 0.78 0.27 0.04 1.00 
       ln𝐴𝐷 × NC 0.70 0.08 0.55 -0.14 0.47 0.56 0.71 0.95 0.54 0.40 0.82 1.00 
      ln𝐷𝑇 × TM -0.38 -0.06 0.22 1.00 -0.52 0.28 -0.40 -0.20 0.20 0.42 -0.51 -0.16 1.00 
     ln𝐷𝑇 × OE 0.09 0.33 0.50 -0.53 1.00 0.55 0.12 0.40 0.52 -0.37 0.65 0.47 -0.51 1.00 
    ln𝐷𝑇 × NC -0.15 0.31 0.92 0.25 0.57 1.00 -0.13 0.47 0.92 -0.03 0.28 0.55 0.26 0.57 1.00 
   ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × TM -0.37 -0.01 0.56 0.90 -0.28 0.59 -0.39 0.04 0.54 0.34 -0.36 0.07 0.90 -0.28 0.57 1.00 
  ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × OE 0.03 0.30 0.73 -0.35 0.96 0.74 0.06 0.50 0.73 -0.28 0.59 0.55 -0.34 0.96 0.75 -0.04 1.00  ln𝐶𝑀𝐸 × NC -0.16 0.23 0.92 0.27 0.54 1.00 -0.14 0.46 0.91 0.00 0.26 0.54 0.28 0.54 0.99 0.59 0.74 1.00 
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4.4.2. Smooth Varying Coefficient Model Specification 
Here we introduce a flexible model which avoids the near multicollinearity 
naturally by its model structure, taking 𝛼(⋅),𝛽1(⋅),𝛽2(⋅)  and 𝛽3 (⋅) as unknown 
functions. ln𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 ,𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡) + ln𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 𝛽1(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡) + ln𝐷𝑇𝑖𝑡𝛽2(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 ,𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡)+ ln𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝛽3(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡, TMit) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                   (3) 
where 𝛼(⋅),𝛽1(⋅),𝛽2(⋅)  and 𝛽3(⋅)  are unknown smooth functions to be estimated 
nonparametrically. The smooth varying coefficient model overcomes another 
disadvantage of the parametric model, the endogeneity issue comes from 
misspecification. Rewrite the model (1) as Yit = Xit′ 𝛾(𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 where γ(Zit) = 𝑍𝑖𝑡′ 𝛿                                                                              (4) 
and  Yit = Xit′ 𝛾0(𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 where γ0(𝑍𝑖𝑡) ≠ 𝑍𝑖𝑡′ 𝛿 ⋯𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙                                            (5) 
To simplify the illustration, we assume that 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is exogenous. Thus 
ϵit = 𝑋𝑖𝑡′ [𝛾0(𝑍𝑖𝑡) − 𝛾(𝑍𝑖𝑡)] + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
which is correlated with 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and the endogeneity issue arises. Though smooth varying 
coefficient model also has an endogenous problem due to the correlation between 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , while it avoids such an endogeneity issue caused by misspecification by 
reducing misspecification probability with flexible model setting up. Therefore our 
semiparametric smooth varying coefficient model mitigates the two problems in the 
parametric multiplicative model. Beside these two main model advantages, we will 
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document other merits of our model flexibility in terms of estimation results, i.e., 𝑅2, 
model fitting, and out-of-sample analysis. 
 
4.4.3. Model Estimation 
We estimate the model (2) and (3) with standard parametric and semiparametric 
approaches. The detailed estimation procedure for the semiparametric smooth varying 
coefficients model is in the Appendix. In the semiparametric specification, we use ad 
hoc bandwidth selection. We draw our conclusions from the estimations in the next 
section. In models above, we exclude the price because of the characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
 
4.5. RESULTS 
4.5.1. Estimation Results 
We get our estimation results for the parametric and semiparametric multiplicative 
model specifications in Table 6 and Table 7. We focus on the parametric and 
semiparametric specifications. Since the coefficients estimations for the semiparametric 
specification are varying and we will use figures to illustrate the responsiveness below. 
For the Fluoxetine category, there is strong order of entry effect, that there is strong 
pioneer advantage. All coefficients are significant in the parametric model in Fluoxetine 
category. However, the results from the parametric model for the Statin category are 
different. First, there is pioneer disadvantage which combined with the pioneer 
advantage for Fluoxetine illustrates the benefit and drawback of entering earlier provided 
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that the models are correct. Furthermore, the coefficients for detailing and competitive 
marketing expenditure are insignificant. The more flexible the model specification is, the 
larger the 𝑅2  is. This indicates that more flexible model specifications increase the 
model fitting performance which can be found in Figure 4 and 5.  
 
 
Table 14 Estimation Results: Fluoxetine 
Estimation Results: Fluoxetine Category 
Variable Parametric Model Semiparametric Model 
Intercept 2.133***  ln𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 0.146***  ln𝐷𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.443***  ln𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 -0.042**  TMit 0.023***  OEit -0.277**  R2 0.7136 0.9412893 
*10% significant; ** 5% significant; *** 10% significant 
 
 
Table 15 Estimation Results: Statin 
Estimation Results: Statin Category 
Variable Parametric Model Semiparametric Model 
Intercept 4.646 ***  ln𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 0.139**  ln𝐷𝑇𝑖𝑡 -0.054  ln𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 -0.018  TMit 0.033***  OEit 0.165***  ln𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 × ln𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 -0.013*  R2 0.6854 0.8989212 
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Figure 4 Smooth Varying Responsiveness of Fluoxetine Category 
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Figure 5 Smooth Varying Responsiveness of Statin Category 
 
 
The smooth varying responsiveness is illuminated in Figure 4 and 5. We see 
obvious varying effectiveness of advertising and detailing. We will explore the details of 
these varying coefficients in section 6 about the managerial implications. The model 
fitting comparison can be found in Figure 6 and Figure 7. We separate the fitting for top 
four brands. In terms of 𝑅2 and model fitting, our results coincide with the intuition that 
the more flexible is the model specification, the better performance is the model.  
The model fittings show that the semiparametric fitted data are more closed to the 
real data than the parametric multiplicative fitted data. This evidence supports the result 
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that the performance in terms of 𝑅2  or model fitting decreases from semiparametric 
specified model to the parametric multiplicative model. 
 
4.5.2. Out-of-Sample Analysis 
In this subsection, we use different time range data and the brands in the 
corresponding range to investigate in which scenario the semiparametric model is better 
and in which condition it is worse than the parametric model. We use three-year to 
seven-year time windows to estimate the in-sample model and with another half-year 
data for out-of-sample predictions. The squares of prediction errors are shown in Table 
16. 
In Fluoxetine Category, PROZAC enters as pioneer, ZOLOFT enters 50 months 
later, PAXIL enters 61 months later and LUVOX enters 85 month later. Therefore for 
the first four years, there is only one pioneer brand: PROZAC. When choosing a five-
year frame, there are two brands. There are three brands for more than six years.  
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Figure 6 Model Fitting Comparison of Fluoxetine Category 
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Figure 7 Model Fitting Comparison of Statin Category 
 
Table 16 Square of Prediction Errors with Different Time Windows 
Square of Prediction Errors: Fluoxetine 
Time Window  3-Year 4-Year 5-Year 6-Year 7-Year 
Parametric One-
Brand 
1.02 1.13    
Semiparametric 0.01 0.01    
Parametric Two-
Brand 
  1.93   
Semiparametric   2.00   
Parametric Three-
Brand 
   3.23 2.74 
Semiparametric    1.84 1.08 
Square of Prediction Errors: Statin 
Time Window  3-Year 4-Year 5-Year 6-Year 7-Year 
Parametric One-
Brand 
0.94 1.31    
Semiparametric 0.16 0.05    
Parametric Two-
Brand 
     
Semiparametric      
Parametric Three-
Brand 
  7.20 5.22 4.48 
Semiparametric   7.39 1.35 0.27 
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The results listed above are the square of prediction errors for different time-frames. 
From  Table 16, we observe that the out-of-sample performance improves when the data 
sample size increases for the semiparametric approach. 
We also conclude that when there is not enough data, the parametric model 
outperforms the semiparametric specification with the prediction figures 8 and 9 for 
Fluoxetine category and Figure 10 and 11 for Statin category in appendix B for each 
brand in all seven time frames. Figure 8 provides out-of-sample predictions with three-
year, four-year and five year time frames. For the first two time frames, the 
semiparametric model predicts better than the parametric model while the results reverse 
with for the first year of ZOLOFT. This result is confirmed with the first year 
performances of the parametric and semiparametric model in Figure 9. The results for 
the two followers are similar as that of the pioneer. Therefore the semiparametric model 
has advantages in richer data scenario while the parametric model should be used with 
small sample sized data. In Statin Category, MEVACOR enters as pioneer, 
PRAVACHOL enters 51 months later, PAXIL enters 53 months later and LUVOX 
enters 80 month later. The results are similar as those in Fluoxetine. 
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Figure 8 Out-of-Sample Predictions with Three to Five Years “In Sample” Time 
Windows: Fluoxetine 
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Figure 9 Out-of-Sample Predictions with Six to Seven Years “In Sample” Time 
Windows: Fluoxetine 
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Figure 10 Out-of-Sample Predictions with Three to Five Years “In Sample” Time 
Windows: Statin 
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Figure 11 Out-of-Sample Predictions with Six to Seven Years “In Sample” Time 
Windows: Statin 
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4.6. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
4.6.1. Implications Based on the Parametric Multiplicative Model Estimation  
From Table 14, we learn that advertising and detailing contribute to the sales of the 
product and the effect of detailing is much larger than that of advertising. This suggests 
firms to allocate more resource to detailing. This is intuitive for the pharmaceutical 
industry since the prescriptions are made by physicians who are specialists and detailing 
provides better targeting. There is a slight but significant up trend for the total 
prescriptions. The longer the brand is in the market, the higher is the sale. This may due 
to the growth of the Fluoxetine category. Our results also document the general sense 
that the advantages of early entry dominate the disadvantages while the order of entry in 
our model conveys the main effect. Therefore late entrants could offset the later entering 
by investing more in advertising and detailing. Also it is not uncommon that the 
competitive marketing expenditure has negative impacts on the sale. This documents the 
competitive effect even though we do not have the number of competitors.  
From Table 15, we learn that in Statin category, the firms should invest more in 
advertising rather than in detailing. This may be misleading because it is well known that 
detailing has higher effectiveness in pharmaceutical industry.  
 
4.6.2. Implications Based on Smooth Varying Coefficient Model Estimation  
The implications derived from the smooth varying coefficient model estimation are 
much dynamic and reasonable than the static ones from parametric multiplicative model. 
We here look at the varying responsiveness brand by brand. From Figure 4, in the early 
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stage, the pioneer has higher responsiveness for detailing than that of advertising and 
hence the pioneer should spend more money in detailing. As the other brands enter the 
market, the responsiveness of detailing for the pioneer vanishes while the positive 
responsiveness of advertising for the pioneer persists. Therefore, at the competitive stage, 
the pioneer should allocate more resource to advertising. For the followers, the story is 
reverse. At their early entry stage, due to existing incumbent, the followers have relative 
advantages in advertising and these advantages disappear as the time goes on. Therefore 
the allocation rules for the followers should be in the opposite direction as that of the 
pioneer.  
For the Statin category, the story is different. From Figure 8, we observe that the 
pioneer, during the early stage of product life cycle, the responsiveness of advertising is 
stronger while at the late stage the effectiveness of detailing is higher. This provides the 
managerial implication that MEVACOR is better off if it allocates more resource to 
advertising at the pioneer stage and invests more in detailing during the competitive 
stage. 
 
4.7. CONCLUSION 
Our analysis is limited to two pharmaceutical categories and the conclusions drawn 
may be different in other categories or other industries while extensions of our model 
could be conducted in future. Furthermore, we have the order of entry and the time in the 
market as contextual variables due to data restrictions. Future research can be done with 
richer datasets by investigating the impact of network size, innovation and other 
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contextual variables. In our model, the sample sizes are 96 and 100 for the two 
pharmaceutical categories which may affect the performances of the smooth varying 
coefficient model. Because the semiparametric models usually need more data than the 
parametric model due to its local utilization of the data. The superiority of the smooth 
varying coefficient model could be documented stronger with richer dataset in the future. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have belief that all effects are context-based, e.g. peer effects strength depends 
on the status of interacting individuals, competitive effects among firms depends on the 
order of entry. This belief amounts to econometrics is the semiparametric varying 
coefficient models. This dissertation contributes to the literature in theoretical and 
empirical perspective. We provide theoretical analysis to discrete game model with 
hierarchy and status and panel data semiparametric truncated regression model with 
fixed effects. With theoretical results for discrete game model, we illustrate the findings 
with empirical study of peer effects in college attendance among high school students. 
Also, we provide dynamic analysis of the effectiveness of advertising and detailing in 
pharmaceutical industry and find different pattern of effectiveness for pioneer and 
follower firms in different stages of competition. 
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APPENDIX 
A Lemma 
A.1 Lemma on Continuous S 
From the definition of Δi(Wn), we have 
Δi(𝑊𝑛) = 𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + �𝛼(0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗)
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
+ �𝛾�Si,𝑆𝑗� ⋅ 𝔼�𝑌𝑗�𝑊𝑛�
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
 
Denote information subsets Isub = �Xi = x, Si = s, NFi = m, �Sj = sj:∀j ∈ Fi��   and Isubb = { Xi = x, Si = s, NFi = m}. Because Isubb ⊆ Isub ⊆ Wn, we have 
𝔼[Δi(𝑊𝑛)|𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏] = 𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + �𝛼�0, 𝑠, 𝑠𝑗�
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
+ �𝛾�s, 𝑠𝑗� ⋅ 𝔼�𝑌𝑗�𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏�
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
 
𝔼[Δi(𝑊𝑛)|𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑏] = 𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + �𝛼�0, 𝑠, 𝑠𝑗�
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
+ �𝛾�s, 𝑠𝑗� ⋅ 𝔼�𝑌𝑗�𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑏�
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
 
Therefore 
𝔼[Δi(𝑊𝑛)|𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏] − 𝔼[Δi(𝑊𝑛)|𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑏] = �𝛾�s, 𝑠𝑗� ⋅ �𝔼�𝑌𝑗�𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏� − 𝔼�𝑌𝑗�𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑏��
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
 
Without loss of generality, we denote the set of friends of individual i as Fi ={i1, i2,⋯  , iNFi} and sij ≠ sik∀ij ≠ ik, ij , ik ∈ Fi. We make the following rank condition. 
Assumption 11. For any individuals i, with 𝑚  friends, there is variation in the 
conditional expectations of friends’ choices, i.e. 
𝑑𝑒𝑡�𝑍𝑖
∗ ⋅ 𝑍𝑖
∗′� ≠ 0 
where 𝑍𝑖∗ = �𝔼�𝑌𝑖1�𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏� − 𝔼�𝑌𝑖1�𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑏�,⋯ ,𝔼�𝑌𝑖1�𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏� − 𝔼�𝑌𝑖1�𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑏��. 
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Assumption 11 first restricts that the status of friends provides more information for 
expectation formation. Second, expectations of friends’ choice are linear independent 
when status is different. Thus we have 
Lemma 4. With assumptions 1 to 3 and 11 hold, we have our model identified when S is 
continuous. 
Proof. Through above discussion, we easily obtain the identification of γ(s, sj)  by 
similar arguments as in the identification of binary status and the rank condition in 
assumption 11. With arbitrary s and sj, we identify γ(·,·). Denote 
Δ�𝑖(𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏) ≡ Δ𝑖(𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏) − � 𝛾(𝑠, 𝑠𝑗)
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
 
Δ�i(Isub) is identified from the identifications of Δi(Wn) and γ. Therefore we have 
Δ�𝑖(𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏) ≡ 𝛽(𝑥) + �𝛼(0, 𝑠, 𝑠𝑗)
𝑗∈𝐹𝑖
 
We here provide the identification of β  and α  through individuals with one or two 
friends. The result can be easily generalized to large but less than M friends case. 
𝔼�Δ�𝑖(𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏)�Xi = x, Si = s, NFi = 1, �Sj = s′:∀j ∈ Fi�� = 𝛽(𝑥) + 𝛼(0, 𝑠, 𝑠′) 
𝔼�Δ�𝑖(𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏)�Xi = x, Si = s, NFi = 1, �Sj = s′′:∀j ∈ Fi�� = 𝛽(𝑥) + 𝛼(0, 𝑠, 𝑠′′) 
𝔼�Δ�𝑖(𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏)�Xi = x, Si = s, NFi = 2, �(Sj, 𝑆𝑗′) = (s′, s′′):∀j, j′ ∈ Fi��= 𝛽(𝑥) + 𝛼(0, 𝑠, 𝑠′) + 𝛼(0, 𝑠, 𝑠′′) 
We achieve the identification of β(x) by 
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β(x) =  𝔼�Δ�𝑖(𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏)�Xi = x, Si = s, NFi = 1, �Sj = s′:∀j ∈ Fi��+ 𝔼�Δ�𝑖(𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏)�Xi = x, Si = s, NFi = 1, �Sj = s′′:∀j ∈ Fi��
− 𝔼�Δ�𝑖(𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏)�Xi = x, Si = s, NFi = 2, �(Sj,𝑆𝑗′) = (s′, s′′):∀j, j′ ∈ Fi�� 
and α(0, s, s′) by 
α(0, s, s′) =  𝔼�Δ�𝑖(𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏)�Xi = x, Si = s, NFi = 2, �(Sj,𝑆𝑗′) = (s′, s′′):∀j, j′ ∈ Fi��
− 𝔼�Δ�𝑖(𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏)�Xi = x, Si = s, NFi = 1, �Sj = s′′:∀j ∈ Fi�� 
Because s and s′ are arbitrarily chosen, we have β(⋅) and α(0,⋅,⋅) identified. 
 
A.2 Lemma 5 
Define N(i,h) as the set of all friends of individual i with largest social distance h, 
where distance is defined as the least link number of transmission from individual i to j. 
Further, let Wn(i,h) be the information set within N(i,h). 
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Figure 12 Social Distance and Neighborhood 
 
 
Lemma 5. With positive choice probability and smoothness, 𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝐼 ,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)  is a 
bounded continuous function in 𝜃. Since 𝛩 is compact, then ℱ𝑛 ≡ {𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛):𝜃 ∈
𝛩} can be covered by a finite number of 𝜖-brackets. To apply the classical Glivenko-
Cantelli argument, it suffices to show the pointwise Law of Large Number (LLN), i.e. for 
any 𝜃 ∈ 𝛩 
𝑄𝑛(𝜃,𝑃𝑛) − 𝑄(𝜃,𝑃𝑛;𝑛) 𝑝→ 0 
Proof. Because 
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𝔼{[Qn(θ, Pn) − Q(θ, Pn; n)]2} = 𝔼��1n�(𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛) − 𝔼[𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)])𝑛
𝑖=1
�
2
�
= 1n2 𝔼�𝔼�� (𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛) − 𝔼[𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊n])𝑛
𝑖=1
�
2
�Wn��
+ 1n2 𝔼 �𝔼��(𝔼[𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊n] − 𝔼[𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)])2𝑛
𝑖=1
�Wn��                           (1) 
We suppress all zero terms in RHS of equation (11). Conditional on Wn, {Yi}i=1𝑛  is 
independent with each other. Then {qi(Yi, Wn; θ, Pn)}i=1n are also conditionally 
independent. From the definition of qi, we know it is bounded and continous, therefore 
we have 
1n2 𝔼�𝔼�� (𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛) − 𝔼[𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊n])𝑛
𝑖=1
�
2
�Wn��
= 1n2 𝔼 � 𝔼(𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛) − 𝔼[𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊n]|𝑊𝑛)2𝑛
𝑖=1
�
= 1n2 × 𝑂(𝑛) = 𝑜(1) 
With similar argument in the proof of Theorem 1, we have, for fixed natural 
number h∗ ∈ ℕ, sup
θ∈Θ
�𝑝𝑖
∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃) − 𝑝𝑖(𝑖,ℎ∗) �𝑊𝑛(𝑖,ℎ∗);𝜃�� ≤ 2𝜆ℎ∗                                                                          (2) 
where 𝑝𝑖
(𝑖,ℎ∗) �𝑊𝑛(𝑖,ℎ∗); 𝜃� is the equilibrium choice probability for individual i in the 
subnetwork comprised with i and her h∗-distance friends. The property in equation (2) is 
 98 
 
called as “pairwise stability” or “network stability”, e.g., in Jackson and Wolinsky 
(1996); Xu (2011). Network stability is crucial for large social network analysis. 
Furthermore, by Taylor expansion, we have sup
θ∈Θ
�𝑝𝑖
∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃) ln 𝑝𝑖∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃) − 𝑝𝑖(𝑖,ℎ∗) �𝑊𝑛(𝑖,ℎ∗);𝜃� ln 𝑝𝑖(𝑖,ℎ∗) �𝑊𝑛(𝑖,ℎ∗);𝜃��
≤ 2(1 + ln 𝑝)𝜆ℎ∗ 
where p is the lower bound of all choice probabilities. 
Hence sup
θ∈Θ
�𝔼[𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊n] − 𝔼 �𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊n(𝑖,ℎ∗)�� ≤ 8(1 + ln 𝑝)𝜆ℎ∗               (3) 
Because 
𝔼���[𝔼(𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊𝑛) − 𝔼(𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)]𝑛
𝑖=1
�
2
�
= 𝔼���[𝔼(𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊𝑛) − 𝔼�𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊𝑛(𝑖,ℎ∗)�𝑛
𝑖=1
�
2
�
+ 𝔼���[𝔼 �𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)�𝑊𝑛(𝑖,ℎ∗)� − 𝔼(𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)]𝑛
𝑖=1
�
2
� 
With equation (13), we have 
𝔼���[𝔼(𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊𝑛) − 𝔼�𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊𝑛(𝑖,ℎ∗)�𝑛
𝑖=1
�
2
� = 𝑂�𝑛2𝜆2ℎ∗� 
Furthermore 
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𝔼���[𝔼�𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)�𝑊𝑛(𝑖,ℎ∗)� − 𝔼(𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)]𝑛
𝑖=1
�
2
�
= � � 𝐶𝑜𝑣 �𝔼 �𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊𝑛(𝑖,ℎ∗)� ,𝔼 �𝑞𝑗�𝑌𝑗 ,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛�|𝑊𝑛(𝑗,ℎ∗)��
𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖,ℎ∗)
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ �𝑉𝑎𝑟 �𝔼 �𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊𝑛(𝑖,ℎ∗)�� = 𝑂�𝑛𝑀ℎ∗� + 𝑂(𝑛)𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Choose h∗ = b ln𝑛
ln𝑀
 for some b ∈ (0, 1). Then h∗ → ∞ as n → ∞ and Mh∗  =  o(n).  h∗ only serves in this proof. Hence 
𝔼���[𝔼�𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)�𝑊𝑛(𝑖,ℎ∗)� − 𝔼(𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)]𝑛
𝑖=1
�
2
� = 𝑂(𝑛) 
Therefore we conclude 
𝔼���[𝔼(𝑞𝑖(Yi,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)|𝑊𝑛) − 𝔼(𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃,𝑃𝑛)]𝑛
𝑖=1
�
2
� = 𝑜(1) + 𝑂�𝑛2𝜆2ℎ∗ + 𝑛�
𝑛2
= 𝑜(1)                                                                                                                  (4) 
where λ2h
∗
→ 0. Therefore with equations (2) to (4), we have 
𝔼[Qn(𝜃,𝑃𝑛) − 𝑄(𝜃,𝑃𝑛;𝑛)]2 → 0 ⇒ 𝑄𝑛(𝜃,𝑃𝑛) 𝑝→𝑄(𝜃,𝑃𝑛;𝑛) 
The pointwise LLN obtained. 
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B Proofs 
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1 
Proof. We show the uniqueness by contradiction. For notation simplification, denote pi = pi(Wn;θ) and P = (p1,⋯ , pn)′ as the vector of equilibrium choice probabilities. 
Suppose there are two equilibria P(1)  and P(2) , P(1) ≠ 𝑃(2) . Let γ(Si, Sj)  = α(1, Si, Sj) − α(0, Si, Sj). For any i, j ∈ I, let 
Γi �𝑊𝑛, �𝑝𝑗�𝑗∈𝐹𝑖;𝜃� = exp�𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + ∑ �𝛼�0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� + 𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� ⋅ 𝑝𝑗�𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 �1 + exp�𝛽(𝑋𝑖) + ∑ �𝛼�0, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� + 𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� ⋅ 𝑝𝑗�𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 � 
Therefore  pi = Γi �𝑊𝑛, �𝑝𝑗�𝑗∈𝐹𝑖;𝜃� 
We assume there is at least one loop connection. With loss of generality, take i as 
one individual in this loop. 
�pi(1) − 𝑝𝑖(2)� = � Γi �𝑊𝑛, �𝑝𝑗+�𝑗∈𝐹𝑖;𝜃� ⋅ �1 − Γi �𝑊𝑛, �𝑝𝑗+�𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 ;𝜃�� 𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗� ⋅ (𝑝𝑗(1)
j∈Fi
− 𝑝𝑗
(2)) � 
where pj+ is a choice probability between pj(1) and pj(2). Because Γi ∈ (0,1), we have 
Γi �𝑊𝑛, �𝑝𝑗+�𝑗∈𝐹𝑖 ;𝜃� ⋅ �1 − Γi �𝑊𝑛, �𝑝𝑗+�𝑗∈𝐹𝑖;𝜃�� ≤ 14 . With assumption 2 and the 
definition of λ, we have 
�pi(1) − 𝑝𝑖(2)� < 𝑀4 maxSi,Sj∈{𝐿,𝐻}�𝛾�𝑆𝑖, 𝑆𝑗�� × maxj∈Fi �𝑝𝑗(1) − 𝑝𝑗(2)� ≤ λmaxj∈I �𝑝𝑗(1) − 𝑝𝑗(2)� 
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Therefore we have max
i∈I
�pi(1) − 𝑝𝑖(2)� < λmaxj∈I �𝑝𝑗(1) − 𝑝𝑗(2)� 
which contradicts with λ <  1  in assumption 3. This completes our proof of the 
uniqueness. 
 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3 
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to show that 
𝔼{Yi ln Γ𝑖(𝑃𝑛(𝜃0),𝑊𝑛;𝜃0) + (1 − 𝑌𝑖)[1 − ln Γ𝑖(𝑃𝑛(𝜃0),𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)]}
≥ 𝔼{Yi ln Γ𝑖(𝑃𝑛(𝜃0),𝑊𝑛;𝜃) + (1 − 𝑌𝑖)[1 − ln Γ𝑖(𝑃𝑛(𝜃0),𝑊𝑛;𝜃)]} 
Note that by definition Pn(θ) solves Pn = Γ(θ, Pn) and the latter admits a unique solution Pn∗ by Theorem 1. We have that Pn(θ0) = P𝑛∗. Hence, it is equivalent to show that 
θ0 = arg max
θ∈Θ
𝔼{Yi ln Γ𝑖(𝑃𝑛∗,𝑊𝑛;𝜃) + (1 − 𝑌𝑖)[1 − ln Γ𝑖(𝑃𝑛∗,𝑊𝑛;𝜃)]} 
which holds by the fact that Yi ln Γ𝑖(𝑃𝑛∗,𝑊𝑛;𝜃) + (1 − 𝑌𝑖)[1 − ln Γ𝑖(𝑃𝑛∗,𝑊𝑛;𝜃)]  is the 
underlying log–likelihood and that the regular conditions in MLE hold. 
 
B.3 Proof of Theorem 
Proof. The proof is similar as that in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007); Newey and 
McFadden (1994). With assumption 8, we have that θNPL = θ0. Recall that the pseudo 
likelihood function is Q𝑛(θ, Pn) in NPL estimation. Denote Λ0 and Λn as the fixed points 
set for Q(θ, Pn; n) and Qn(θ, Pn) respectively. Define the function T(θ, Pn) ≡ max
c∈Θ
{𝑄(𝑐,𝑃𝑛;𝑛)} − 𝑄(𝜃,𝑃𝑛;𝑛) 
 102 
 
Because Q(θ, Pn; n)  is continuous and Θ × [0,1]n  is compact, Berge’s maximum 
theorem establishes that T(θ, Pn) is a continuous function. By construction, T(θ, Pn) ≥ 0 
for any (θ, Pn). Let ℇ be the set of vectors (θ, Pn) that are fixed points of the equilibrium 
mapping Γ, i.e., 
ℇ ≡ {(θ, Pn) ∈ Θ × [0,1]n:𝑃𝑛 = Γ(𝜃,𝑃𝑛)} 
Given thatΘ × [0,1]n  is compact and Γ  is continuous, then ℇ  is a compact set. By 
definition, the set Λ0 is included in ℇ. Let Bϵ(θ0) = {θ ∈ ℝL : ∥ θ − θ0 ∥ < ϵ,∀ϵ > 0} 
be an arbitrarily small open ball that contains θ0 , we have that Bϵ(θ0) ∩ ℰ  is also 
compact. Define the constant 
τ = min(𝜃,𝑝1)∈Bϵc(θ0)∩ℰ 𝑇(𝜃,𝑃𝑛) > 0 
Define the event An ≡ �|𝑄𝑛(𝜃,𝑃𝑛) − 𝑄(𝜃,𝑃𝑛;𝑛)| < 𝜏2  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝜃,𝑃𝑛) ∈ Θ × [0,1]𝑛� 
Let �θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛)� be an element of Λn. Then we have that An implies 
G�θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛);𝑛� > 𝐺𝑛�𝜃(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛)� − 𝜏2 
and Gn�θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛)� > 𝐺�𝜃(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛);𝑛� − 𝜏2 
Furthermore, we have Gn�θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛)� ≥ Gn�θ,𝑃𝑛(𝑛)� from the NPL fixed point definition. 
Therefore we have that G�θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛);𝑛� > G�θ,𝑃𝑛(𝑛);𝑛� − 𝜏 . Thus we have the 
following derivation: 
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An ⇒ �G�θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛);𝑛� > G�θ,𝑃𝑛(𝑛);𝑛� − 𝜏 for any θ ∈ Θ� 
⇒  �G�θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛);𝑛� > maxθ∈Θ G�θ,𝑃𝑛(𝑛);𝑛� − 𝜏� 
⇒ �τ > T�θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛);𝑛�� ⇒ min(𝜃,𝑝1)∈Bϵc(θ0)∩ℰ 𝑇(𝜃,𝑃𝑛) > T�θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛);𝑛� 
⇒ ��θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛)� ∈ 𝐵𝜖(θ0)� 
The last induction uses the fact that �θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛)� ∈ ℰ . Therefore Pr(An) ≤ 
𝑃𝑟��𝜃𝑛,𝑝1(𝑛)� ∈ 𝐵𝜖(𝜃0)� . Because Pr(An) → 1 as n → ∞ from appendix A.1, and ϵ is 
an arbitrarily small constant, we have 
�θ(𝑛),𝑃𝑛(𝑛)� 𝑝→ (𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗) 
From the definition of Λn, we have that θ�𝑁𝑃𝐿
𝑝
→ 𝜃0. 
 
 
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4 
Proof. From the first order condition we have that  
∂Qn(𝜃,𝑃𝑛)
𝜕𝜃
|(𝜃,𝑃𝑛)=(θ�𝑁𝑃𝐿,𝑃�𝑛) = 0 
For notational simplicity, we denote 
∂Qn(𝜃,𝑃𝑛)
𝜕𝜃
|(𝜃,𝑃𝑛)=(θ�𝑁𝑃𝐿,𝑃�𝑛) = ∂Qn�𝜃� ,𝑃�𝑛�𝜕𝜃 . Taking Taylor 
expansion of above equation around the true parameter (θ0, Pn∗), we have 
∂Qn(𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗)
𝜕𝜃
+ ∂2Qn(𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗)
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝜃′
�𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿 − 𝜃0� + ∂2Qn(𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗)𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑃𝑛 𝜕𝑃𝑛𝜕𝜃 �𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿 − 𝜃0� + 𝑜𝑝(1)  = 0                                                                                                                         (5) 
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where the op(1) comes from similar argument in the proof of lemma 5. Further, from 
the definition of Qn, we have 
∂Qn(𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗)
𝜕𝜃
= 1
𝑛
�
𝜕𝑞𝑖(𝑌𝑖,𝑊𝑛;𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗)
𝜕𝜃
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 1
𝑛
�𝑋𝑖
∗�𝑌𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖
∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�𝑛
𝑖=1
                            (6) 
From equation (5) and equation (6), we have that 
�
∂2Qn(𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗)
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝜃′
+ ∂2Qn(𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗)
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑃𝑛
𝜕𝑃𝑛
𝜕𝜃
�√𝑛�𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿 − 𝜃0�
= − 1
√𝑛
�𝑋𝑖
∗�𝑌𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖
∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑜𝑝�√𝑛�                                                (7) 
For any κ ∈ ℝd+ds , let ρ(κ, Wn) = κ′ �∂Qn(𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗)𝜕𝜃 �−12 , then there is 1
√nκ′κ 𝜌(𝜅,𝑊𝑛)�𝑋𝑖∗�𝑌𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑑
→ 𝑁(0,1)                                                              (8) 
To motivate the condition of Cramer-Wold Theorem, we rewrite equation (8) as 
κ′ ��
∂Qn(𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗)
𝜕𝜃
�
−
1
2
�𝑋𝑖
∗�𝑌𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖
∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�𝑛
𝑖=1
�
𝑑
→
𝜅′
√𝜅′𝜅
𝑁�0, 𝐼𝑑+𝑑𝑠� 
Because κ is an arbitrary vector, by Cramer-Wold Theorem, we have 
��
∂Qn(𝜃0,𝑃𝑛∗)
𝜕𝜃
�
−
1
2
�𝑋𝑖
∗�𝑌𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖
∗(𝑊𝑛;𝜃0)�𝑛
𝑖=1
�
𝑑
→ 𝑁�0, 𝐼𝑑+𝑑𝑠� 
Therefore we have 
√n�𝜃�𝑁𝑃𝐿 − 𝜃0� 𝑑→ 𝑁�0,Ω(𝜃0)� 
where  
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Ω(θ0) = 𝑉−1(𝜃0) ⋅ 𝑉1(𝜃0) ⋅ 𝑉−1(𝜃0). 
 
C Smooth Varying Coefficient Model yit = 𝛼(𝑍1𝑖𝑡,𝑍2𝑖𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽(𝑍1𝑖𝑡,𝑍2𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where Z1it is the continuous smooth variable and Z2it is the discrete smooth variable. Xit 
is the regressor. In our market response context, Xit contains marketing mix variables, 
advertising and detailing, and competitive marketing expenditure. Z1it is the time in the 
market and Z2it  is the order of entry. Denote Zit = (𝑍1𝑖𝑡,𝑍2𝑖𝑡)  , Wit = (1,𝑋𝑖𝑡′ )′  and 
θ(Zit) = (𝛼(𝑍𝑖𝑡),𝛽(𝑍𝑖𝑡)′)′. Therefore we have yit = 𝑊𝑖𝑡′ 𝜃(𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
⇒ E(Wityit|𝑍𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡′ |𝑍𝑖𝑡)𝜃(𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 0 
⇒ θ(Zit) = [𝐸(𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡′ |𝑍𝑖𝑡)]−1E(Wityit|𝑍𝑖𝑡) 
Replace the conditional expectations with their nonparametric kernel estimators we have 
𝜃�(Zit) = �𝐸�(𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡′ |𝑍𝑖𝑡)�−1 E� (Wityit|𝑍𝑖𝑡), 
where  
E�(𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡′ |𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧) = ∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑗𝑠𝑊𝑗𝑠′ 𝐾 �𝑍𝑗𝑠 − 𝑧ℎ �𝑇𝑠=1𝑛𝑗=1
∑ ∑ 𝐾 �
𝑍𝑗𝑠 − 𝑧
ℎ �
𝑇
𝑠=1
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
E�(𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧) = ∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝐾 �𝑍𝑗𝑠 − 𝑧ℎ �𝑇𝑠=1𝑛𝑗=1
∑ ∑ 𝐾 �
𝑍𝑗𝑠 − 𝑧
ℎ �
𝑇
𝑠=1
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
where 
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K �𝑍𝑗𝑠 − 𝑧
ℎ
� = K1 �𝑍1𝑗𝑠 − 𝑧1ℎ1 � × L2 �𝑍2𝑗𝑠 − 𝑧2ℎ2 � 
Kernel function takes standard normal form when Z is continuous  
K1 �𝑍1𝑗𝑠 − 𝑧1ℎ � = 1√2𝜋 𝑒−�𝑍1𝑗𝑠−𝑧1�2ℎ2  
Kernel function takes the following form when  Z is discrete 
L2 �𝑍2𝑗𝑠 − 𝑧2𝜆 � = �1 𝑖𝑓 𝑍2𝑗𝑠 = 𝑧2𝜆 𝑖𝑓 𝑍2𝑗𝑠 ≠ 𝑧2          
 where 𝜆 ∈ [0,1]  is the bandwidth for the discrete choice variable Z2  and h  is the 
bandwidth for the continuous smooth variable respectively. 
 
The semiparametric estimator for varying coefficients are consistent,  𝜃�(𝑍𝑖𝑡) −
θ0(𝑍𝑖𝑡) = op(1) . This result can be found in Cai and Li (2008). In our smooth 
coefficient model, we do not incorporate the fixed effects since the order of entries 
identifies the brands and are cross sectional though we put a time subscript in them. The 
results for smooth coefficient panel data model with fixed effects can be found in Sun, 
Carroll and Li (2009).  
In our application, the Cross-Validation Least Square method for bandwidth selection 
under-smooths the coefficient estimation. Therefore we adopt ad hoc bandwidth 
selection in our analysis. The ad hoc bandwidth selection is widely used in the empirical 
application of semiparametric and nonparametric methods, see Li and Racine (2007) and 
Horowitz (2009) for details. The ad hoc bandwidth selections are as follows 
had = 𝑐1𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝑍1𝑖𝑡) × 𝑛𝑡− 1q+4 
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λad = 𝑐2𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝑍2𝑖𝑡) × nt− 2𝑞+4 
Where q is the dimension of Zit. c1 and c2 are positive constant, which we take as ones. 
